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Introduction
Suppose a young woman from another country appears at the border
and asks for asylum, alleging she fears persecution based on her mem-
bership in a particular social group, the Romany People. Are the gyp-
sies a social group within the meaning of refugee law? What about
homosexuals? Women subjected to wife abuse? People with physical
handicaps? Taxi drivers?
This article analyzes the social group concept in refugee law from a
comparative perspective. In international law, refugees are those who
can demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, reli-
gion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social
group. These criteria stem from the refugee definition adopted by the
1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Con-
vention).1 Because more than 100 states have become parties to the
Convention 2 and have agreed to be bound by its refugee definition, the
jurisprudence of other countries provides interesting points of compari-
son to the refugee definition that is evolving in United States law.
The article first briefly reviews the historical background to the
Geneva Convention, focusing on the expansion of the refugee definition
to include persecution based on membership in a social group. Next, it
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1. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6260,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
2. Poland became the 109th state party on September 20, 1991. REFUGEE REP.
(U.S. Comm. for Refugees, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 30, 1991, at 5. See also M. J.
BOWMAN & D. J. HARRIS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX AND CURRENT STATUS 125
(Supp. 1991); GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE (Hurst Hannum,
ed., 2d ed., 1992), 281-82; Refugees, Sept. 1990, at 6.
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examines the English language literature concerning the social group
basis for refugee status. It then explores the meanings that different
countries have given to persecution based on social group. The article
emphasizes the relevant jurisprudence in Germany, Canada, and the
United States, the three countries with the most developed decisional
law concerning refugee status.3 The article concludes that approaches
articulated in Germany and Canada can be instructive to decision-mak-
ers in the United States. In particular, it suggests that judges and asy-
lum officers analyzing social group-based claims pay close attention to
societal perceptions of the social group to which the asylum seeker
belongs.
. A Brief History of the Refugee Definition
A. International Agreements
International efforts to define the status of refugees date from the disin-
tegration of the Russian and Turkish empires in the early twentieth cen-
tury.4 The early international agreements relating to refugees tended to
focus on particular refugee groups, such as Russians,5 Armenians, 6 or,
even more specifically, German refugees from the Saar. 7 As the cata-
clysm of war approached during the 1930's, there were renewed
3. Asylum decisions in many Western European countries are committed to an
administrative process with little or no judicial review. As a result, there are rela-
tively few judicial opinions concerning asylum in those countries. In contrast, the
asylum laws in Germany, Canada, and the United States provide for several layers ofjudicial review, which results in a much more extensive body of case law. See generally
Maryellen Fullerton, Persecution Due to Membership in a Particular Social Group: Jurispru-
dence in the Federal Republic of Germany, 4 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 381, 384-85 (1990).
4. NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES:
ITS HISTORY, CONTENTS AND INTERPRETATION 1 (1953).
5. Id. at 2. The Arrangement of 12 May 1926 defined Russian refugees as: "Any
person of Russian origin who does not enjoy or who no longer enjoys the protection
of the Government of the USSR and who have not acquired another nationality."
The Arrangement of 12 May 1926, 89 U.N.T.S. 47.
6. ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 2. Armenian refugees were defined in the
Arrangement of 12 May 1926 as: "Person[s] of Armenian origin formerly subject[s]
of the Ottoman Empire who [do] not enjoy or who no longer [enjoy] the protection
of the Government of the Turkish Republic and who have not acquired another
nationality." Id.
7. For example, the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization
defined Saar refugees as "all persons who, having previously had the status of
inhabitants of the Saar, have left the territory on the occasion of the plebiscite and
are not in possession of national passports." The Constitution of the International
Refugee Organization, Dec. 15, 1946, 18 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter IRO Constitution].
In addition, a definition was provided for refugees of the Sudentenland as persons
"having possessed Czecho-Slovak nationality and not now possessing any nationality
other than German, [who] have been obliged to leave the territory .. . known as
Sudentenland," formerly part of Czecho-Slovakia and that at that time incorporated
in Germany. The term "refugee" was also applied to victims of Nazi persecution who
had resided in Germany or Austria, including all Jews, foreigners, and stateless per-
sons who "were detained in, or were obliged to flee from and were subsequently
returned to, one of those countries as a result of enemy action, or of war circum-
stances, and have not yet been firmly resettled therein." Id.
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attempts to devise international agreements protecting the movement of
* refugees.8 Unfortunately, fewer and fewer governments signed each
new agreement. 9 With the advent of war in 1939, efforts to formalize
new international refugee agreements halted.' 0 Consequently, in the
aftermath of World War II the international community found itself ill-
equipped to respond to the flood of post-war refugees. 1
8. A plan for the issuance of certificates of identity for refugees from the Saar
was signed on July 30, 1935, followed by a July 4, 1936 provisional arrangement
concerning the status of refugees coming from Germany, and the Convention Con-
cerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany, signed on February 10, 1938.
The February 10, 1938 Convention was made applicable to refugees from Austria by
the international protocol of September 14, 1939. ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 2-3.
9. While 16 states signed the plan ofJuly 30, 1935, only seven states signed the
July 4, 1936 provisional arrangement, and only three signed the February 10, 1938
Convention and the September 14, 1939 protocol. ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 2-3.
10. No states signed conventions between September 14, 1939 and October 15,
1946. Id. at 3.
11. Prior to World War II the majority of international agreements relating to
refugees dealt solely with the issuance of identity papers. ROBINSON, supra note 4, at
2. Other arrangements intended to address the legal status of refugees, though
legally effective, were not of significant import because they were not widely
accepted. Id. at 3. Despite increased need, the only international agreement to be
signed in behalf of refugees at the end of World War II was the London Agreement
of October 15, 1945. The London Agreement concerned the issuance of travel docu-
ments to refugees from Germany, Austria, and Spain, and to some smaller groups.
In Germany and Austria the occupying powers established a special status for refu-
gees, but in other countries little was done to regularize their status.
The Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) regulated the
status of new categories of refugees. The IRO successfully made arrangements to
regularize the status of refugees with Luxembourg, Italy and Belgium. France
arranged to do so in regard to identity documents and work papers only. In other
countries the IRO could only intervene in specific instances. IRO Constitution, supra
note 7.
"The [IRO] was the first international organization created by the United
Nations." HOLBORN, THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION 1 (1954). The
IRO was established to meet the international crisis created by approximately one-
and-a-half million persons who refused to return to countries of origin following
World War II. Id. at 1. The need for an international effort was voiced at the San
Francisco conference of May 7, 1945, at which the charter of the United Nations was
drawn, by the UK delegate, who expressed concern for those displaced persons who
had not been repatriated by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administra-
tion (UNRR) and the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees (IGCR), or who
were outside of their protection because they were under the mandate of the High
Commissioner of the League of Nations. Id. at 29.
The IGCR was established at the intergovernmental conference of July 1938,
which was called by President Roosevelt, and held at Evian-les-Bains, France, under
the direction of the United States and Great Britain, to formulate a means to aid
persons fleeing Germany in response to National Socialism which had been on the
rise since 1933. Id. at 3, 11.
The Agreement Creating the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administra-
tion, signed November 9, 1943 at the White House by forty-four Nations, established
the UNRR. Its purpose was to supplement the programs of the allied military forces,
and to help prisoners of war and "exiles" return home. Id. at 17.
Modelled to some extent after the UNRR and the IGCR, which dealt with the main-
tenance, care and repatriation of displaced persons, the IRO was also equipped to
provide for large scale permanent resettlement. Id. at 2. The IRO operated for six
years before it was succeeded by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
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The United Nations convened a conference of plenipotentiaries in
Geneva in 1951 to consider an international agreement to provide legal
protection to refugees.1 2 This conference resulted in the 1951 Geneva
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.' 3 The 1951 Conven-
tion, which has been signed by 109 governments to date,' 4 was the first
international compact to adopt a universal refugee definition, rather
than one tied to a particular national or ethnic group.' 5 The Conven-
tion defines as refugees those who face a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion "for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion."' 6
gees. It aided in the resettlement of approximately 1,620,000 refugees. Guy GooD-
WIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 72 (1983). Its functions included
repatriation, identification, registration, and classification of refugees; it provided
legal and political protection, as well as transport, care and assistance in resettle-
ment. Id. at 129. Its final Director General referred to it as "[t]he most successful
example of large-scale international cooperation for humanitarian purposes in his-
tory." Id.
12. The conference was convened pursuant to a resolution by the United Nations
Human Rights Commission. On the basis of this resolution, the Economic and Social
Council, on March 2, 1948, adopted a resolution requesting the Secretary General of
the United Nations to undertake a study of the existing situation in regard to the
protection of stateless persons. U.N. Doc. E/1618,E/AC.32/5. As a result of this
study, the Economic and Social Council adopted a resolution on August 8, 1949
appointing an Ad Hoc Committee consisting of 13 representative governments. The
Ad Hoc Committee convened onJanuary 16, 1950, and on February 16 completed its
work and adopted a Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and a Proto-
col thereto Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. U.N. Doc. E/1618, E/AC.32/
5. A revised version of this draft was to be submitted to the General Assembly at its
fifth session. U.N. Doc. E/1850,E/AC.32/8. However, the General Assembly
decided instead to convene a conference of plenipotentiaries in Geneva, in order to
permit non-members of the United Nations to participate in the final drafting of the
document. ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 3-5.
13. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28,
1951, 19 U.S.T. 6260, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
14. The Convention was most recently signed by Poland on September 20, 1991.
Poland was also the 109th state to sign the 1967 Protocol. REFUGEE REP., supra note
2. See infra note 15.
15. However, by its terms the Convention limits the definition of refugee to those
persons affected by events occurring beforeJan. 1, 1951. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, art. 1, at A(2), 19 U.S.T. 6260,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. The scope of the definition was broadened by
the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 8791 [hereinafter Protocol], which was
drafted to protect persons who became refugees as a result of events occurring after
January 1, 1951. Protocol, Jan. 31, 1967, art. 1. See G.A. Res. 2198, 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 48, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). The Protocol changes the 1951 time
deadline in Article I and incorporates Articles 2 through 34 of the 1951 Convention.
Four nations, Madagascar, Monaco, Mozambique, and Samoa, have signed the
1951 Convention only. Four nations, Cape Verde, Swaziland, the United States, and
Venezuela, have signed the 1967 Protocol only. Ninety-nine other nations have
signed both the 1967 Protocol and the 1951 Convention. UNHCR Manual, Annex I
(rev. Jan. 4, 1989), reprinted in SAMUEL K. N. BLAY & B. MARTIN TSAMENYI, 2 INTERNA-
TIONALJOURNAL OF REFUGEE LAW 560 (1990).
16. Article 1 of the Convention provides:
A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "refugee" shall
apply to any person who:
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This refugee definition is broader than the prior practice in two
ways. It links refugee status to those who have a basis for fearing perse-
cution rather than to a specific crisis or a specific nationality group.
Moreover, it expands the reasons that warrant refugee status. It speci-
fies five grounds: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, and mem-
bership in a social group. The first four grounds were present in the
draft convention considered by the conference of plenipotentiaries. t 7
The fifth, membership in a particular social group, was introduced at the
conference as an amendment by the Swedish representative.1 8 In sup-
port of his amendment the Swedish representative stated that "experi-
ence ha[s] shown that certain refugees ha[ve] been persecuted because
they belonged to particular social groups. The draft [c]onvention
[makes] no provision for such cases, and one designed to cover them
should be accordingly included."' 19 Unfortunately, there is no further
(2) [As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951] and owing
to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6260, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
The Convention permits states to limit further the scope of the refugee definition
by allowing them to choose between two definitions of "events occurring before 1
January 1951," explicitly stating that this term "shall be understood to mean either
(a) 'events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951'; or (b) 'events occurring in
Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951.'" Id. at art. 1B(l)(a)(b). Only six coun-
tries adhere to the European limitation (Congo, Madagascar, Malta, Monaco, Para-
guay, and Turkey). BOWMAN & HARRIS, supra note 2, at 171, Supp. at 125.
17. The General Assembly prepared a definition of the term "refugee" at its fifth
session, at which it was also decided to convene the conference of plenipotentiaries
responsible for the final drafting of the Convention. Resolution 429 (V), Annex.
The Assembly recommended to the respective governments that they consider this
definition when preparing the text of the Convention. ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 5.
See also the draft prepared by the Ad Hoc drafting committee, Doc. E/1850,E/
AC.32/8; ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 4 n.4.
Also, the recent antecedents had included four of these grounds. The IRO identi-
fied specific groups of refugees which would be protected, including victims of the
Nazi, Fascist, or Quisling regimes that had opposed the United Nations. In addition,
the IRO protected certain Jews, foreigners or stateless persons who had been victims
of Nazi persecution and persons who had been considered refugees prior to World
War II. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 11, at 4. The IRO Constitution had also sought to
protect other individuals who feared persecution due to race, nationality, or political
opinion, Part I, § C, I(a)(i); one who feared persecution due to religion also demon-
strated a valid basis for refugee status. U.N. Doc. E/REF/19 at 2 (ECOSOC; Apr. 11,
1946). See also U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/L/40 at 13 (Aug. 10, 1950); Arthur C. Helton,
Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group as a Basis for Refugee Status, 15
COLuM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 39, 40 n.9, 41 n.13 (1983).
18. A/CONF.2/SR.3 at 14. See ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 53 n.37; Helton, supra
note 17, at 41 n.15; David Compton, Asylum for Persecuted Social Groups: A Closed Door
Left Slightly Ajar, 62 WASH. L. REv. 913, 925 (1987).
19. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.3, at 14 (1951). The Swedish delegate was Sture
Petren. Compton, supra note 18, at 925 n.89. Maureen Graves, From Definition to
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record discussing the purpose or meaning of this term,20 although the
Italian representative had earlier favored the adoption of an "ampler"
definition than that included in the draft Convention. 2 ' Nonetheless,
the conference adopted the amendment by a vote of fourteen to zero
with eight abstentions. 22 The record contains no comments on the
vote. 23 The delegations appeared far more concerned with restricting
the geographical and time limits of the refugee definition 2 4 than with
discussing the categories of persecution.2 5
B. National Legislation
By ratifying the Geneva Convention, states agree to abide by the refugee
definition contained in the treaty. The Convention does not, however,
require state parties to admit refugees to their territory. 26 The admis-
sion decision is left to state law. Many states have enacted the Conven-
tion refugee definition as part of their domestic legislation and have
established the refugee definition as a criterion for admission to the
country. A short survey of the asylum law in Europe and North America
reveals the significant impact the Convention refugee definition has had.
In France, national legislation defines refugees using the precise
terms of the Convention definition.2 7 Those who can satisfy the refugee
definition are entitled to remain in the country.2 8 In Switzerland, the
Exploration: Social Groups and Political Asylum Eligibility, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 739, 748
n.51 (1989).
20. See, e.g., A/CONF.2/SR.19-24. Compton, supra note 18, at 925 n.91. It is
interesting to note that the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, which the
conference of plenipotentiaries viewed as one of the foundations for its work,
Helton, supra note 17, at 41 n.16, forbids discrimination based on "national or social
origin, property, birth or other status." U.N. Doc. A/811, art. 2.
21. U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/L.40, at 13 (1950); Graves, supra note 19, at 748 n.51.
22. A/CONF.2/SR.23 at 8. There were no negative votes cast. The record does
not note which delegations favored the amendment and which delegations abstained.
Compton, supra note 18, at 925 n.92. Article I of the draft convention, as amended
to include persecution based on social group, then passed by a vote of twenty-two to
zero, with one abstention. A/CONF.2/SR.23 at 10. See also Helton, supra note 17, at
42 n.17; Graves, supra note 19, at 748.
23. A/CONF.2/SR.23 at 8-10. Compton, supra note 18, at 925 n.92.
24. See supra notes 16-17.
25. See, e.g., A/CONF.2/SR.19-24; Compton, supra note 18, at 925.
26. The Convention does not require state parties to admit refugees or grant
them asylum. It only requires states to grant certain rights to those refugees the
states have decided to admit. See generally art. 4, 13-30. The Convention does limit to
some extent the power a state has over refugees. Article 33 prohibits states from
returning refugees to territories where they would face threats to their life or free-
dom due to their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a
social group. Article 32 forbids the expulsion of refugees lawfully present in the
country absent compelling reasons of national security or public order. Article 31
prohibits states from penalizing refugees who entered the country illegally, so long as
they have come directly from a territory where their lives or freedom were threatened
and they present themselves to the police immediately.
27. Loi du 25 juillet 1952 portant cr6ation d'un office frangais de protection des
refugi6s et apatrides [Law ofJuly 25, 1952 Creating the French Office of Protection
for Refugees and Stateless Persons], art. 2, 2. [Law # 52-803].
28. Id.
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refugee definition includes those who suffer serious prejudice due to
their race, religion, nationality, social group, or political opinions. 29
The Swiss Asylum Act guarantees admission to those refugees who meet
the definition.3 0 In Denmark, the immigration statute provides that resi-
dence permits shall be issued to those aliens who fall within the provi-
sions of the 1951 Refugee Convention.3 1 The statute further states that
residence permits are available for aliens who do not fall within the
terms of the Convention but "for reasons similar to those listed in the
Convention or for other weighty reasons" should not be returned to
their home country.3 2 In Canada, the Immigration Act of 1985
expressly includes the Convention refugee definition.3 3 Additionally,
Canada on occasion recognizes as refugees certain limited groups that
do not satisfy the Convention definition. 34
The situation in Germany differs somewhat. Although the Federal
Republic signed the Convention in 195135 and ratified it in 1953,36 this
29. Loi sur l'asile, 5 Oct. 1979, FF 1979. II. 977, Asylgesetz vom 5 Okt. 1979, BBI
1979 11 1993 [Asylum Act], art. 3.
30. Id.
31. Udlaendingeloven [The Aliens Act], Act. No. 226, June 8, 1983, as amended by
Act. No. 232, June 6, 1985; Act No. 574, Dec. 19, 1985; and Act No. 686, art. 7(1),
Oct. 17, 1986).
32. Id. art. 7(2).
33. The Immigration Act expressly uses the term "Convention refugee" and
defines "Convention refugee" as:
any person who
(a) by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion,
(i) is outside the country of the person's nationality and is unable or, by
reason of that fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country, or
(ii) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of the
person's former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that
fear, is unwilling to return to that country, and(b) has not ceased to be a Convention refugee by virtue of subsection (2),
but does not include any person to whom the Convention does not apply
pursuant to section E or F of Article 1 thereof, which sections are set out in
the schedule to this Act.
Section 2(I), Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.I-2, THE ANNOTATED IMMIGRATION Acr
OF CANADA (Frank N. Marrocco & Henry M. Goslett eds., 1993).
34. See Barbara Jackman, Well-Founded Fear of Persecution and Other Standards of Deci-
sion-Making: A North American Perspective, in AsyLuM LAW AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND
NORTH AMERICA 39-40 (Geoffrey Coll & Jacqueline Bhabha eds., 1992) (discussing
discretionary administrative programs permitting admission based on relaxed
criteria).
35. The Federal Republic of Germany formally signed the Convention on
November 19, 1951. Multilateral Treaties Deposited With the Secretary General,
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/6, 181 (1987).
36. The Federal Republic of Germany ratified the Convention on December 1,
1953. Id. The enabling legislation, Gesetz vom 1.9.53 [Law of Sept. 1, 1953],
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI.] II 559, authorized the terms of the Convention to take effect
on April 22, 1954 pursuant to the official notice given by the Federal Minister of
Foreign Affairs on April 25, 1954, BGBI. II 619. See REINHARD MARX ET AL., KOM-
MENTAR ZUR ASYLVERFAHRENSGESETZ 15 (2d ed. 1987).
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was not Germany's first post-war law concerning refugees. The Basic
Law, or Constitution as it is commonly known, expressly guarantees a
right of asylum to those persecuted for political reasons.37 On its face
the constitutional provision varies from the Convention refugee defini-
tion in two major respects. First, it affirmatively grants refugees a right
to enter the country. Second, it guarantees asylum only to those sub-
jected to political persecution; there is no mention of persecution based
on other grounds. The German courts, however, have interpreted the
constitutional grant of asylum to include persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, and social group, as well as persecution on account
of political opinion.38 Thus, the refugee definition contained in the
Convention has been influential in determining the scope of refugees to
whom German law provides the right of asylum.39
In contrast to the situation in Germany, United States legislation in
the post-war period did not contain a Convention-influenced refugee
definition. 40 This changed in 1980 when the United States Congress
37. Grundgesetz [GG], art. 16, 2 ("Persons persecuted on political grounds shall
enjoy the right of asylum.") This provision has triggered great debate in Germany as
the number of asylum seekers has risen to close to 300,000 per year. As a conse-
quence, the major political parties have decided to seek an amendment of this consti-
tutional guarantee. On May 26, 1993, the Bundestag (lower house of Parliament)
voted to amend the constitution to limit applicants from certain countries from filing
requests for asylum. Germany Acts on Asylum Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1993, at Al.
On May 28, the Bundesrat (upper house of Parliament) voted to amend the constitu-
tional provision of asylum. As of July 1, 1993, asylum-seekers from countries
deemed free of persecution will be prohibited from entering Germany. Bonn Bars
Asylum-Seekers, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1993, at 3.
38. Judgment of July 2, 1980, Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional
Court], Bundesverfassungsgerichtsentscheidungen (BVerfGE) [Federal Constitu-
tional Court Decisions] 54, 341 (359).
39. Although influenced by the Convention definition, the German courts have
not equated the constitutional guarantee of asylum with the Convention definition.
For example, the courts have emphatically stated that the constitutional guarantee of
asylum requires an objective standard of persecution while the term "well-founded
fear of persecution" included in the Convention definition contains both a subjective
and an objective element. See Walter Kain, Well-founded Fear of Persecution: A European
Perspective, in ASYLUM LAW AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 29 (Geoffrey
Coll &Jacqueline Bhaba eds., 1992).
There are also other aspects in which the refugee definitions contained in the Con-
vention and Constitution diverge. The important point is that although they are not
identical, the Convention definition has played a significant role in the development
of the asylum law of Germany.
40. In the 1950s United States law contained no general authorization to admit
refugees. In response to specific refugee crises, such as the 1956 Hungarian Revolu-
tion, Attorneys General occasionally exercised their parole power under § 212(d)(5)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act to admit refugee groups. Congress has also
reacted on occasion to particular refugee crises by enacting legislation targeted at a
specific group of refugees. See Congressional Review Service, Review of U.S. Refu-
gee Resettlement Programs and Policies 7-11 (Comm. Print, Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 1980); James L. Carlin, Significant Refugee Crises Since World War II and the
Response of the International Community, 1982 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 3 (1982);
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 830 (1992).
In 1965 Congress enacted a new immigration law that reserved 6%y of all immi-
grant visas for refugees fleeing Communist-dominated countries, the Middle East,
Vol 26
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enacted legislation revising the procedures that apply to refugees enter-
ing the United States.4 1 The Refugee Act of 1980 explicitly incorpo-
rates the basic terms of the Geneva Convention refugee definition:
refugees are individuals with a "well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion." 42 Moreover, the legislative history of the
Refugee Act of 1980 demonstrates that Congress intended to bring the
United States refugee definition into conformity with the Geneva Con-
vention definition.43
The legislative history of the 1980 Refugee Act sheds little light on
the social group aspect of the refugee definition, however. Similar to
the situation at the conference in 1951, it appears that Congress did not
focus on the social group concept and gave no explicit indication of its
understanding of the purpose or meaning of this term. Indeed, the only
direct comment was made in 1968 by President Johnson, when he sent
the 1967 Protocol to the Senate for ratification: "The Protocol consti-
and catastrophic natural calamities. Pub. L. 89-236, § 3, 79 Stat. 911, 913 (Oct. 3,
1965). Since this legislation limited refugee admissions to a number inadequate to
respond to the contemporary refugee crises and since the Attorney General still
retained the parole power under INA § 212(d) referred to above, many refugees
entered the United States during the 1960s and 1970s via parole. See LEGOMSKY,
supra, at 830-832; Deborah Anker & Michael Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative
History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 12-20 (1981). Finally, in
1980, Congress passed a comprehensive refugee law strongly influenced by the 1951
Convention.
41. The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). The statute provides two paths for
processing people fleeing persecution. Sections 207 and 209 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-1159, provide for admission for those who
apply from outside the United States. Section 208 of the INA provides for admission
for those who are at or within the borders of the United States when they apply for
refuge, 8 U.S.C. § 1158. Both processing routes require the individual seeking
admission to satisfy the refugee definition set forth in § 101(a)(42) of the INA, 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). For a description of this provision, see infra note 43 and
accompanying text. See also T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRA-
TION PROCESS AND POLICY 693-708 (2d ed. 1991) (overview of statutory provisions).
42. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Although not a verbatim incorporation of the
Geneva Convention definition, the refugee definition of the Refugee Act of 1980 is
very similar to that contained in the Geneva Convention. The Geneva Convention
defines refugees as any person "persecuted for reasons of... membership in a par-
ticular social group," whereas the Refugee Act defines a "refugee" as a person perse-
cuted or having a "well-founded fear of persecution on account of... membership in
a particular social group." The United States adopted the legal standards embodied
in the Geneva Convention when it became a party to the 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees. The 1967 Protocol explicitly incorporated the refugee defini-
tion contained in the Geneva Convention which the United States did not sign. Arti-
cle 1.2. of the Protocol states: "[Flor the purpose of the present Protocol, the term
'refugee' shall.., mean any person within the definition of Article I of the Conven-
tion," with the limitation as to events occurring before January 1, 1951 excluded.
43. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987). For example, the
Conference Committee Report stated that the Refugee Act's definition of refugee
was accepted "with the understanding that it is based directly upon the language of
the Protocol and it is intended that the provision be construed consistent with the
Protocol." Id. at 437 (quoting S. Rep. No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 20 (1980)).
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tutes a comprehensive Bill of Rights for refugees fleeing their country
because of persecution on account of their political views, race, religion,
nationality, or social ties."'44
Nonetheless, despite the silence in the legislative history, in one
important respect relevant to deciding the meaning of persecution
based on social group the situation in 1980 was different from that in
1951. By 1980, almost thirty years had passed since the original inclu-
sion of the social group term. In that time commentators had begun to
sketch in the contours of the social group concept;4 5 the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had pre-
pared a book that attempted to give meaning and guidance to the use of
this concept;4 6 and some courts in Europe had begun to identify catego-
ries of people persecuted based on membership in a social group.4 7
Accordingly, although the United States Congress may not have articu-
lated the meaning it intended for social group-based persecution, a sub-
stantial body of academic, administrative, and judicial interpretations of
this term had developed, and Congress gave no indication that it
intended to reject those developments.
II. Scholarly Interpretation
A. International Law Treatises
Despite a dearth of scholarly commentary on the social group concept,
noted scholars have recognized the significance of this aspect of the ref-
ugee definition. Grahl-Madsen, in his classic two-volume scholarly treat-
ment of international refugee law, describes the addition of the social
group term as an afterthought. 48 He notes that the social group concept
44. 114 Cong. Rec. 24,628 (1968). The Senate ratified the Protocol, which con-
tained the Geneva Convention refugee definition, in 1968. Later Congress enacted
the Refugee Act of 1980, which was intended, in part, to implement the Protocol by
expressly conforming the statutory refugee definition to the Convention/Protocol
definition. See supra note 43. Thus, the Refugee Act of 1980 was based on, and
intended to make explicit in domestic law, the United States' acceptance of the inter-
national law refugee definition.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 48-69.
46. OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PRO-
CEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVEN-
TION AND 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, U.N. Doc. HCR/
PRO/4 (1979) [hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK]. For a discussion of this Handbook,
see infra text accompanying notes 70-78. For a discussion of whether Congress was
aware of the UNHCR Handbook when it drafted the Refugee Act of 1980, see Matter
of Acosta, Int. Dec. 2986 (BIA 1985) at 15 n.8.
47. ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 219-
220 (1966) (noting four cases decided in the Federal Republic of Germany and one
in Italy concerning the following social groups: textile manufacturers and dealers,
Ansbach Court, Case 2531 11/56 (15Jan. 1957); independent businessmen, Ansbach
Court, Case 3008 11/57 (25 Nov. 1957); former royalist diplomats, Ansbach Court,
Case 3017 11/57 (15 Oct. 1957); former capitalists, Commissione Paritetica, Trieste
Session (9 to 26 Nov. 1960); and former royalist military officers, Ansbach Court,
Case 2309 11/59 (23 Feb. 1960)).
48. Id. at 219.
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is broader than race, religion, and ethnic background 49 -although it can
also include these categories-and asserts that the 1951 conference
added the idea of social group in order to protect against persecution
based on as yet unforeseen reasons. 50 In reviewing the five relevant
grounds of persecution recognized by the 1951 Geneva Convention,
Grahl-Madsen categorizes them in two groups: qualities beyond the con-
trol of individuals and qualities within their control.51 He assigns mem-
bership in a particular social group, along with race, nationality, and
religious heritage, to the first category,5 2 political opinion and religious
observance to the second. 53
The examples of pertinent social groups that he suggests, however,
include groups in which membership is voluntary-members of clubs,
societies, and associations-as well as groups in which membership may
be said to be involuntary-the nobility, for example, or members of a
linguistic or other minority.54 His examples of particular social groups
also include economic and occupational groups in which membership is
at least theoretically voluntary, including landowners, civil servants, cap-
italists, businessmen, professional people, farmers, and workers. 55
Although one can surrender land, resign from the civil service, leave the
farm, or decline to obtain professional training, Grahl-Madsen presuma-
bly views these as involuntary in the sense that individuals who have
been part of such economic or occupational groups often continue to be
identified with them.
For example, a government that persecutes landowners or civil
servants will often persecute former landowners and former civil ser-
vants, as well as anyone currently in those groups. 56 Moreover, persecu-
tion of such groups often reaches the children and grandchildren, who
obviously first became group members involuntarily. 57 Although mem-
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 217.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 219.
55. Id.
56. For example, during the Cultural Revolution in China, the Red Guards cate-
gorized as "blacks" children whose families had formerly been landlords or wealthy
peasants. "Blacks" and their families were beaten, harassed, had their homes raided
and property destroyed. JUNG CHANG, WILD SWANS 294-300 (1991).
57. Two recent judicial opinions from the Federal Republic of Germany illustrate
this point. In the first case, a Chinese man, orphaned at the age of five, testified that
for years after the death of his parents and grandparents members of his agricultural
collective frequently criticized, humiliated, and even beat him because members of
his family had been landowners. Administrative Court of Bavaria, Judgment of Mar.
29, 1983, No. VR-China-X-167, at 2, 7-8. The court found his statements credible
and granted him asylum.
In the second case, a Romanian woman from a prosperous family, whose father
had been a bank director and whose husband had been a physician in the royal army,
suffered persecution long after her father and husband both had died. Administra-
tive Court of the Saarland, Judgment of Dec. 10, 1982, No. 1OK-1 15/80, at 3-4. The
court credited her allegations and granted her asylum. (Copies of opinions on file
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bership in clubs, societies, and associations usually appears to be more
transitory and fluid than membership in an economic group, perhaps
Grahl-Madsen also views these truly voluntary activities as beyond the
members' control. There, too, persecutors of the group may ignore the
distinction between current and former members, and a one-time volun-
tary act, such as joining a social club, may be impossible later to change.
A former club member, despite an intentional lapse of membership and
the absence of any continued shared interests with the members of the
social club, may still be perceived and persecuted as a club member.
Although this explanation is plausible, Grahl-Madsen never explicitly
articulates it, and his analysis ultimately fails to reconcile his claim that
social group persecution is based on involuntary qualities with his inclu-
sion of group memberships that seem to be within an individual's
control.
Focusing on the apparent inconsistency between Grahl-Madsen's
formulation and the examples he provides may, however, be misleading.
His inclusion of groups which one can voluntarily reject or from which
one can theoretically resign may suggest that people should not have to
forsake certain activities. For example, one can argue that although one
can theoretically surrender one's economic status and livelihood, one
should not have to do so. 5 8 Under this reasoning, persecution of civil
servants and persecution of the nobility are both persecution based on
membership in a social group, although birth into the noble class is
beyond the control of the individual in a way that becoming a civil ser-
vant is not. Although this interpretation of Grahl-Madsen's discussion
of membership in a particular social group is more satisfying, a workable
theory of social group-based persecution under this view would require
a principle for determining which attributes an individual should not be
asked to change.5 9
Although Grahl-Madsen does not provide a coherent theory of
social group-based persecution, his insight is important: persecution for
reasons beyond one's control is obviously offensive. The converse,
however, is not true. Punishing individuals for attributes or actions
within their control does not necessarily involve punishment of blame-
worthy behavior. Ultimately, Grahl-Madsen's categories are incomplete
with the author.) See also NIEN CHENG, LIFE AND DEATH IN SHANGHAI 30-31 (1986)(pervasive discrimination in China against children of the educated and affluent).
58. See discussion of Acosta, supra note 46; see also infra notes 230-51 and accompa-
nying text.
59. The Acosta opinion, supra note 46, suggests that individuals should not have to
change traits fundamental to their identities or to their consciences. Matter of
Acosta, Int. Dec. 2986, at 31 (BIA 1985). James Hathaway states that individuals
should not have to sever their ties to voluntary social groups if the purpose of the
group is fundamental to their human dignity. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REF-
UGEE STATUS 161 (1991). In turn, he looks to "core human rights" expressed in
international law to determine rights and attributes fundamental to human dignity.
Id. at 164-68.
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because they do not distinguish when punishment for voluntary acts
involves blameworthy behavior from when it does not.
Turning from Grahl-Madsen to Goodwin-Gill, another eminent
scholar of international refugee law, one encounters a noticeable shift in
the analysis of social group-based persecution. Goodwin-Gill suggests
that the concept of particular social group includes "people in a certain
relation or having a certain degree of similarity, or a coming together of
those of like class or kindred interests."'60 In contrast to Grahl-Madsen,
he expressly asserts that the "shared interests, values, or background"
of a social group are likely to combine qualities over which individuals
have no control with matters that they can control.61 He stresses the
importance of recognizing groups based on "ethnic, cultural, and lin-
guistic origin; education; family .background; economic activity; shared
values, outlook, and aspirations."'62 Accordingly, his concept of social
group includes groups that are based solely on an accident of birth, such
as ethnic and linguistic origin and family background, as well as groups
defined by factors that may involve a good deal of individual choice,
such as economic activity, education, and shared aspirations.
Goodwin-Gill also emphasizes the importance of societal attitudes
toward subsets within that society,6 3 noting that widely shared percep-
tions often indicate the existence of a persecuted social group. 64 He
does not limit his view of pertinent societal attitudes to official govern-
ment views of the group, but he acknowledges that treatment of the
group by state authorities is particularly relevant. 65 Although Goodwin-
Gill's focus on sub-groups within a society leads him to discuss social
minorities as self-conscious units bound together by shared physical or
cultural traits that are held in low esteem by dominant members of soci-
ety,66 his approach does not conclude that social groups invariably con-
stitute a numerical minority. He suggests, for example, that in certain
societies women may be a persecuted social group despite being a
60. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 11, at 30.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Goodwin-Gill refers to the following criteria identifying social minorities:
(1) Minorities are subordinate segments of complex state societies; (2) minor-
ities have special physical or cultural traits which are held in low esteem by
the dominant segments of the society; (3) minorities are self-conscious units
bound together by the special traits which their members share and by the
special disabilities which these bring; (4) membership in a minority is trans-
mitted by a rule of descent which is capable of affiliating succeeding genera-
tions even in the absence of readily apparent special cultural or physical
traits; (5) minority peoples, by choice or necessity, tend to marry within the
group.
GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 1I, at 30 n.45 (quoting SIMPSON & YINGER, RACIAL AND
CULTURAL MINORITIES 17 (1965)).
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numerical majority.6 7 Goodwin-Gill concludes that a comprehensive
definition of social group is likely to be impossible, and argues that any
attempt at a definition should be open-ended so that it could expand to
include different groups suffering persecution. 68 No matter what verbal
formulation is selected, he favors focusing on two critical elements: (1)
the factors that unify the putative group and (2) the factors that distin-
guish it from the rest of the population and make it the target of
persecution. 69
A third important source interpreting the social group term is the
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status.70 The
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees pub-
lished the Handbook in 1979, almost thirty years after the 1951 Refugee
Convention. 7 1 Although not privy to the views of the drafters of the
refugee definition contained in the Convention, the authors of the Hand-
book were able to explain the components of the Convention definition
by drawing on the knowledge gained by the High Commissioner's Office
over twenty-five years. 7 2 Their efforts were exhaustive: they investi-
gated the practices of signatories to the Convention in determining refu-
gee status, the literature concerning refugee status, and the views
developed by UNHCR legal staff members during a quarter century of
monitoring the application of the refugee definition. 73 The work that
the authors devoted to the Handbook, as well as their vantage point from
the legal division of the High Commissioner's Office, has led U.S. courts
and administrative tribunals to view the Handbook as a "significant
source of guidance" regarding the legal definition of a refugee.7 4
In light of the cumulative effort devoted to articulating the terms of
the refugee definition, the Handbook ' definition of social group is nota-
ble for its breadth and simplicity. The Handbook describes a particular
social group as a group of people of "similar background, habits or
social status."'7 5 The Handbook does not explicitly address the issue of
involuntary versus voluntary group membership. The attributes it lists,
however, are broad enough to cover both situations. For example, the
67. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 11, at 31 n.46. Cf. David L. Neal, Women as a Social
Group: Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution as Grounds for Asylum, 20 CoLuM. HUM. RTs. L.
REv. 203 (1988) (arguing that women who are persecuted on account of their sex
should be eligible for asylum in the United States and that the framework for grant-
ing asylum is already in place).
68. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 11, at 30.
69. Id. at 30-31.
70. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 46.
71. Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. 2986, at 221 n.8 (BIA 1985) (noting that the
Handbook was published in September 1979, after the drafting of the U.S. Refugee
Act of 1980).
72. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 46.
73. Id.
74. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Zavala-
Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS,
777 F.2d 509, 567 n.7 (9th Cir. 1985); Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. 2986, at 22 (BIA
1985) (calling the UNHCR Handbook a "useful tool").
75. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 46, para. 77.
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background of individuals may include their family lineage, yet it may
also include the training and education that they pursued.
In an attempt to provide a context for examining claims of persecu-
tion based on membership in a social group, the Handbook suggests that
members of a social group may become targets of persecution when the
government lacks confidence in the group's loyalty.7 6 Similarly, mem-
bers of a social group may face serious threats if the government views
the "political outlook, antecedents or economic activity" of the group's
members or the "very existence of the social group" itself as an obstacle
to government policies. 7 7 Thus, the Handbook expressly indicates that
persecution based on membership in a social group may be combined
with persecution based on political opinion. This corresponds with the
Handbook's warning that social group persecution often overlaps with
persecution premised on other grounds.7 8
A decade after the publication of Goodwin-Gill's treatise and the
UNHCR Handbook, James Hathaway, a Canadian scholar, published an
important new work on refugee law79 that proposes what might be
viewed as a moderate approach to the concept of social group. After
noting the sparse contemporaneous explanation for this addition to the
refugee definition in 1951, Hathaway describes cases that essentially
render the term redundant by equating social group with notions of
race, religion, nationality, or political opinion.8 0 He contrasts that view
with the "safety net" approach, which views any collection of persons
who share some similarity of background as a social group.8 '
Hathaway rejects both approaches. He discounts the first approach
because he concludes that the delegates to the 1951 Refugee Confer-
ence would not have adopted the amendment adding social group as a
ground of persecution covered by the Refugee Convention if they had
viewed social group as merely superfluous.8 2 He discounts the second
because, although "seductive from a humanitarian perspective, . . . it
largely eliminates the need to consider the issue of a linkage between
fear of persecution and the civil or political status" of the refugee appli-
76. Id. para. 78.
77. Id. para. 78.
78. Id. para. 77. The Handbook expressly states: "A claim to fear of persecution
under [the] heading ['membership of a particular social group'] may frequently over-
lap with a claim to fear of persecution on other grounds, i.e. race, religion or nation-
ality." Id. Obviously, refugees can simultaneously rest their fear of persecution on
several of the different categories listed in the 1951 Geneva Convention.
79. HATHAWAY, supra note 59.
80. E.g., Obertz Belfond, 10 I.A.C. 208, 222 (1975) ("[e]ither the [social] group
must be political ... or be a religious sect ... [or] a racial minority"). See also Guy
Goodwin-Gill, Entry and Exclusion of Refugees: The Obligations of State and the Protection
Function of the Office of the UNHCR, 1980 MICH. Y.B. INT'L STUD. 291, 297 (1980).
81. See I. Foighel, Legal Status of the Boat People, 48 NORDISK TIDSSKRIvr FOR INTL.
RET. 217, 222 (1979) (social group category added as safety net to cover those with
legitimate claim to refugee status though not included in other categories in refugee
definition); Helton, supra note 17, at 41 (social group category is catch-all to include
all bases for persecution relied on by a despot).
82. HATHAWAY, supra note 59, at 157-58.
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cant.8 3 The intent of the drafters of the Refugee Convention was just
the opposite, according to Hathaway: they expressly chose to distin-
guish between those whose fear was due to their civil or political status
and those whose fear was due to some other reason.8 4 Furthermore,
Hathaway concludes that the drafters acted with a glance backward at
history. They intended the refugee definition to encompass known
forms of harm, not to encompass as yet unanticipated forms of abuse.8 5
The middle ground approach set forth by Hathaway echoes the
approach suggested by the United States Board of Immigration Appeals
in Matter of Acosta.86 As Hathaway defines the term, three types of
groups can give rise to claims of persecution based on membership in a
particular social group:
(1) groups defined by an innate, unalterable characteristic; (2) groups
defined by their past temporary or voluntary status, since their history or
experience is not within their current power to change; and (3) existing
groups defined by volition, so long as the purpose of the association is so
fundamental to their human dignity that they ought not to be required to
abandon it. Excluded ... are groups defined by a characteristic which is
changeable or from which dissociation is possible, so long as neither
option requires renunciation of basic human rights.
... [The] linkage between this standard and fundamental norms of
human rights correlates well with the human rights-based definition of
"persecution." Most important, the standard is sufficiently open-ended
to allow for evolution in much the same way as has occurred with the four
other grounds, but not so vague as to admit persons without a serious
basis for claim to international protection.8 7
As examples of groups based on innate and immutable characteris-
tics, Hathaway points to gender-based groups.8 8 For example, he con-
cludes that "single women living in a Moslem country without the
protection of a male relative" is a cognizable social group, pointing out
that group members cannot control gender or the absence of male rela-
tives, and that choice of marital status is a fundamental human right that
no one should be required to relinquish.8 9 To the concern that gender
is a trait shared by huge numbers of people, he responds that race, reli-
gion, nationality, and political opinion are also characteristics shared by
very large groups.90 As another example of social groups bound
83. Id. at 159.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. 2986 (BIA 1985). For a fuller discussion, see infra
notes 230-51 and accompanying text.
87. HATHAWAY, supra note 59, at 161.
88. Id. at 162-63.
89. Id. at 162, referring to Incirdyan, Immigration Appeal Board Decision, M87-
1541X, Aug. 10, 1987. See infra note 208.
90. He does not address one issue that can be said to distinguish gender from the
other bases. Approximately 50%o of the population of every country in the world are
women and, thus, in some way is categorized by gender. No other race, religion,
nationality, or political belief is so widespread. As a result the social group of women
has potentially many more members than a group based on race or religion.
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together by a fundamental, immutable characteristic, Hathaway points
to homosexual and bisexual men and women.
9 1
Hathaway also considers families as particular social groups.9 2 It is
unclear whether Hathaway views families as groups defined by an unal-
terable characteristic-the accident of birth-or as groups bound
together in an association so fundamental to their human dignity that
they should not be required to change their membership. His reference
to the protection accorded under international law to the family as the
fundamental unit in society9 3 suggests the latter analysis, but his exam-
ples of family members persecuted because they are perceived to be sur-
rogates for their kin9 4 suggests the former. Perhaps he views family
members as social groups that fall into both or even all three social
group categories. 9
5
In his examination of social class, 9 6 Hathaway concludes that a
social class organized around a changeable characteristic that is unlikely
to be fundamental to human dignity or integrity may fall outside the
concept of social group. He illustrates his point by describing a privi-
leged social class-the large landowners, let us say-which resists
renouncing its privilege. The landowners can renounce their extensive
land holdings, which are not innate and immutable, and which are not
protected by core human rights norms. If the same people were contin-
ually denounced as members of the landed gentry even after renouncing
their land, however, they would constitute a social group because their
past status is something beyond their power to change.
9 7
More provocatively, Hathaway suggests that the poor as a class
might constitute a particular social group in light of the fact that poverty
is a condition that people often cannot voluntarily renounce. 98 He fur-
ther asserts that a technically voluntary economic class-peasant land-
owners in poor countries, for example-may also constitute a social
group if membership in the class is the only means of ensuring food and
91. HATHAWAY, supra note 59, at 163.
92. Id. at 164-65.
93. Id. at 164, citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 16(3) G.A. Res.
217A(III), U.N. Doc. A810 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 23(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
94. HATHAWAY, supra note 59, at 165 (referring to cases involving siblings of polit-
ical activists (Bernarda Lucia Ramirez Cordero, Immigration Appeal Board Decision
M79-1211, Dec. 12, 1980) and children of activists (Askall Asnake, Immigration
Appeals Board Decision M80-1020, Feb. 23, 1981)).
95. See supra text accompanying note 85. It is certainly possible to hypothesize
three different scenarios featuring persecution against family members based on: (1)
their relationship by blood (innate, immutable characteristic) to others deemed dis-
loyal; (2) their voluntary participation in the past in the privileges enjoyed by the
family even though they have renounced those privileges (e.g., royal family; children
of nobility; landed gentry); and (3) their continued voluntary participation in their
family (an association so fundamental to human dignity that they should not be
obliged to abandon it).
96. HATHAWAY, supra note 59, at 166-67.
97. Id. at 166.
98. Id. at 167.
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shelter9 9 because group members should not be forced to renounce the
core human right of basic subsistence.' 0 0 Although Hathaway comes
close to eroding the line between refugees and economic migrants, a
distinction clearly drawn by the UNHCR Handbook,t0 ' there is a distinc-
tion between Hathaway's poverty-based social group and economic
migrants. Economic migrants are persons who voluntarily leave their
countries exclusively for economic reasons.' 0 2 In contrast, Hathaway's
version of the poor and peasant landowners as social groups is linked to
the other requirements of refugee status: they must have a well-founded
fear of persecution for membership in their group. Consequently, they
must prove at least three elements in addition to poverty: membership
in a social group, fear of persecution, and persecution based expressly
on that membership.
In sum, Hathaway views social class as a status that might fall within
any of the three criteria he has proposed to define the social group con-
cept. Class designations such as caste may be immutable; other class
identities can be changed but continue to stigmatize their members even
though they have voluntarily renounced the class privilege; and some
social class designations can be renounced only at the cost of core
human rights.
The last category of social groups that Hathaway examines is volun-
tary associations.10 3 In essence, he suggests that there is a presumption
against voluntary associations as social groups because the abuse that
membership may trigger can be halted by the decision to disassociate
from the group. 10 4 The presumption is overriden, however, when
membership in the voluntary association is a matter of conscience or
human dignity or otherwise a fundamental human right. 10 5 Thus, recre-
ational clubs would likely fall outside the definition, 1° 6 but students-
who are pursuing the basic right to an education 0 7-would fall within
it. Similarly, groups categorized by profession or employment would
fall within the social group concept, based on the basic right to choose
an occupation,' 0 8 as would trade unions, based on the basic rights to
99. Id.
100. Id. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 93, at art.
25(1): "[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
care ....
101. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 46, paras. 62-64.
102. Id. para. 62 ("If [a person] is moved exclusively by economic considerations,
he is an economic migrant and not a refugee.").
103. HATHAWAY, supra note 59, at 167-69.
104. Id. at 167-68. For example, gender, sexual orientation, family, class and caste
are generally beyond the individual's control.
105. Id. at 168.
106. Id.
107. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 93, at art. 26; Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 13, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
108. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 93, at art. 23(1); Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 6.
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associate freely109 and to seek just working conditions.110
B. Commentary on United States Law
In addition to scholars who have examined the status of refugees in
international law, commentators in the United States have discussed and
analyzed the social group provision included in the Refugee Act of 1980.
Generally, they have contended that the statutory refugee definition,
including the social group provision, should be interpreted broadly."lI
They note that the purposes underlying the Refugee Act of 1980 were
generous: to expand the recognition of refugees and to standardize the
refugee processing procedures.1 12 Arthur Helton, a noted refugee
advocate, argues that it is significant that the refugee definition refers to
social group, rather than to ethnic group, minority group, or cultural
group. He points out that social group is broader than the other terms.
For example, people who lack a common ancestry do not comprise an
ethnic group; economic classes, such as the bourgeoisie, are not typi-
cally perceived as a minority group; and individuals with transitory com-
mon interests or goals do not constitute a cultural group.11 3
Nonetheless, the term social group can encompass all these sets of peo-
ple. Accordingly, he concludes that the choice of the term "social
group" demonstrates an intent to formulate a broad, inclusive refugee
definition.
109. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 93, at art. 23(4); Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 8; International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, supra, note 93, at art. 22(1).
110. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 23(1); International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 7.
111. See Helton, supra note 17; Graves, supra note 19; Carolyn Patty Blum, Refugee
Status Based on Membership in a Particular Social Group: A North American Perspective, in
ASYLUM LAW AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, supra note 34. Blum also
discusses persecution based on social group in her article The Ninth Circuit and the
Protection of Asylum Seekers Since the Passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, 23 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 327 (1986), but her main focus is on the standard of proof required for proving
a well-founded fear of persecution. Neal, supra note 67, has focused on women as a
social group. He, too, takes an expansive approach, although his focus throughout
remains on women. It should be noted, however, that despite his comments on
women as a social group, Neal more specifically examines persecution against a sub-
set of women-women who deviate from social norms about women's roles. Id.
112. Graves, supra note 19, at 744-45. The Refugee Act of 1980 expanded the
refugee definition by removing limitations based on the geographical origins of those
seeking asylum and the governmental political ideologies of the countries from which
they fled. Prior to the passage of the Act, the pattern was for the United States to
generously protect persons fleeing left wing governments, but to deny protection to
persons fleeing right wing "friendly" governments. Congress repealed geographic
restrictions that limited refugee status, in addition to adding the broader definition of
"refugee." See supra note 42 and accompanying text. See supra note 41 for discussion
of new refugee processing provisions.
113. Helton, supra note 17, at 43-44.
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Helton argues from a silent legislative record in advancing this view
of the framers' intent.114 As noted earlier," t5 the discussions of the
term "social group" by the framers of the refugee definition in the 1951
Geneva Convention resound in near total silence. Faced with this
impediment, Helton turns to other nearly contemporaneous treaties to
see what light they may shed on the meaning of "particular social
group." He contrasts the 1951 refugee definition with that of groups
protected by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide. 16 Article II of the Genocide Convention refers
to the elimination or persecution of racial, ethnic, national, and religious
groups. 1 17 The terms of the Genocide Convention have been inter-
preted not to apply to political, economic, social, and cultural groups. 18
Scholarly authors have criticized the Genocide Convention as too nar-
row in scope." 9
According to Helton, the sequence of the conventions is important.
The Refugee Convention added social group to its definition of pro-
tected groups several years after the adoption of the Genocide Conven-
tion by the General Assembly and after criticism of its narrow scope.
Helton infers from this that the drafters of the Refugee Convention
intended to avoid the mistakes of the Genocide Convention by formulat-
ing a broad definition of refugee. Helton may be correct, but at best the
evidence he relies on is inconclusive. The General Assembly adopted
the Genocide. Convention in 1948 and it came into force in 1951.120
The scholarly criticisms of the scope of the Genocide Convention on
which Helton relies were not published until 1959 and 1974, respec-
tively, long after adoption of the Geneva Convention. We do not know
whether the representatives at the 1951 conference were acquainted
with any criticism of the Genocide Convention, and whether the repre-
sentatives were responding to the perceived inadequacies of the Geneva
Convention is lost to history.' 2 1
114. Helton's argument addresses the original formulation of the refugee defini-
tion as expressed in the 1951 Convention. Id. at 42-44. This formulation is relevant
to the meaning of the 1980 United States legislation because the U.S. statute was
intended to conform U.S. law to the international refugee law specified in the 1967
Protocol, which in turn incorporated the 1951 Convention's refugee definition.
115. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
116. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 227.
117. "[G]enocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group .... " Id. art. II.
118. Helton, supra note 17, at 42 n.20 (citing PETER NICHOLAS DROST, THE CRIME
OF STATE: BOOK II, GENOCIDE 122 (1959)).
119. Helton, supra note 17 (citing FRANK J. MOORE, THAILAND, ITS PEOPLE, ITS
SOCIETY, ITS CULTURE 64 (1974)).
120. BOWMAN & HARRIS, supra note 2, at 146.
121. Apart from the provisions of the Genocide Convention, Helton's argument
for an expansive refugee definition rests on a dictionary definition. To define cul-
tural group, Helton refers only to the AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1967): those
who store "the sum total of ways of living built up by a group of human beings, which
is transmitted from one generation to another." Helton also refers to definitions
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Helton also examines groups that have been the focus of United
Nations concern as examples of social groups that the refugee definition
would potentially protect: slaves, workers, migrant workers, unem-
ployed workers, trade unions, women, children, families, the elderly, the
young, the adopted, the illegitimate, the illiterate, and the disabled.'
22
Although these groupings of individuals might indeed qualify as social
groups under the refugee definition, none of the United Nations resolu-
tions and declarations discussing the groups Helton lists focuses on
refugees. 123
Similarly, Helton also argues for inclusion of social groups men-
tioned in judicial opinions in the United States in a non-refugee context:
blacks, Mexican-Americans, Native Americans, women, homosexuals,
and linguistic groups.' 24 He suggests that these groups are easily iden-
tifiable because they possess immutable characteristics and have histori-
cally been oppressed in the United States. 125 Further, Helton lists social
included in various United Nations documents. To define minority group, Helton
relies on U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub 2/384/Add.5 at 7: "[a] group numerically inferior
to the rest of the population of the State... whose members-being nationals of the
State- . . . possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from the
rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, direction
towards preserving their culture, traditions or language."
To define ethnic group, Helton relies on U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/416 at 19,
quoting J. MASSIAH, ETHNIC STRUCTURE OF THE WEST INDIES 1: a "descent group,
differentiated by language, culture, style, national origin, kinship ties and religious
belief." All of these sources are dated many years after the 1951 conference.
Whether the representatives in Geneva in 1951 considered, and rejected as too nar-
row, the ethnic and cultural group categories and consciously selected the social
group concept as broader and more desirable is not known. The legislative history
remains inconclusive. Accordingly, Helton's strongest argument is that a "plain
meaning" statutory interpretation analysis suggests that a broad interpretation
should be given to social group. The "plain meaning" of such a vague term, how-
ever, is not obvious.
122. Helton, supra note 17, at 44-45. Helton has compiled this list from U.N. reso-
lutions and declarations passed 15 to 25 years after the 1951 Refugee Convention.
123. For example, Helton refers to the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 93; the U.N. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
supra note 107; the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV) 14
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959); Question of the Elderly and
the Aged Resolution, 26 U.N. GAOR Res. 2842, adopted Dec. 18, 1971; and the Inter-
national Year for Disabled Persons Resolution, 31 U.N. GAOR Res. 31/123, adopted
unanimously Dec. 16, 1976.
124. Helton, supra note 17, at 48-50. Helton does not refer to decisions concern-
ing refugee status; rather he identifies groups that have relied on the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to
challenge discriminatory acts. Id. There is no requirement that an individual articu-
late membership in a social group as a basis for an equal protection challenge.
125. Id. at 48. While race and sex are generally seen as immutable, sexual prefer-
ence and linguistic group may be perceived as within a person's power to change. In
a recent case concerning an asylum-seeker from Iran, a court in the Federal Republic
of Germany noted that there is an extensive debate about the immutability of sexual
preference. Administrative Court of Wiesbaden,Judgment of Apr. 26, 1983, No. IV/
IE 06244/81, at 9 (opinion on file with author). For a recent discussion of the con-
temporary American debate concerning the immutability of sexual preference, see
Andrew Sullivan, The Politics of Homosexuality, NEw REPUBLIC, May 10, 1993, at 24-37.
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groups mentioned by United States courts that share neither immutable
characteristics nor a history of oppression: the educated, the wealthy,
the poor, the permanent residents of a geographical area, those who
share sporting interests, those who share recreational interests, those
who share political goals, and those who share a particular view of
morality.' 26 Analyzing this list leads Helton to contend that American
courts accept the proposition that there are an infinite number of social
groups, and that recognition of groups by courts is limited only by
"convenience." 12 7
In making this assertion, Helton overstates his claim. The social
groups he mentions have, by and large, not been recognized by the
courts to have any claim to legal entitlement. More often than not, the
cases cited by Helton include dicta in which the courts refer to sets of
people such as the "educated and uneducated,"' 128 the "rich and
poor,"' 129 the "social groups within a sailing club,"' 130 "summer camp-
ers," 13' and "social groups composed of moral delinquents."' 3 2 It is
far-fetched to suggest that courts would view members of these groups
as refugees, entitled to enter and live permanently in the United States.
Furthermore, U.S. courts expressly have concluded that, in the context
of the refugee definition, there are not an infinite number of social
groups. Indeed, the administrative and judicial decisions'13 interpret-
ing social group-based refugee claims have been strongly criticized for
adopting a very constricted definition of social group.' 34
Helton also notes that the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice (INS) deems former South Vietnamese soldiers and former refugee
In the German case mentioned above, the court ultimately rejected the govern-
ment's argument that the asylum-seeker would not fear persecution in Iran if he
refrained from homosexual activity. The court considered the government's argu-
ment as unacceptable as an admonition to refrain from practicing a religion. Id. Fur-
thermore, in light of the death penalty for homosexual activity in Iran, the court
considered it likely that the mere identification of the asylum-seeker as a homosexual
might jeopardize his life. Id. at 8. See infra notes 177-78.
126. Helton, supra note 17, at 49-50.
127. Id. at 50.
128. Id. at 49 n.69 (citing Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947) (challenge to jury
selection process that resulted in jury pool in which professionals were dispropor-
tionately represented and manual laborers were totally missing)).
129. Id. at 49 n.70 (citing South Cutler Bay, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 349
F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (challenge by real estate developer to local
building moratorium)).
130. Id. at 49 n.73 (citing Cohan v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 591, 597 (E.D.
Mich. 1961) (yacht club member's suit to recover excise taxes on club charges)).
131. Id. at 50, n.74 (citing Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U.S. 388, 407 (1960) (Black, Jr.
dissenting) (challenge to judgment of civil contempt for refusing to produce names
of persons attending summer camp for use in investigation of "subversive persons"
within the state)).
132. Id. at 50 n.75 (citing Besig v. United States, 208 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1953)
(obsenity trial of two Henry Miller novels, Tropic of Cancer and Tropic of Capricorn)).
133. See, e.g., Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. 2986 (BIA 1985); infra notes 230-51;
Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1511; infra notes 268-87. It must be noted, how-
ever, that these decisions were issued after Helton published his article.
134. See, e.g., Graves, supra note 19, at 770-86.
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workers in Indochina as presumptively entitled to refugee status.1 3 5
Although persecution of these two groups could be categorized as per-
secution based on social group, it is more likely that this persecution is
based on a political opinion imputed to those groups.' 3 6 Similarly,
Helton mentions the presumptive eligibility of Catholics and ethnic Chi-
nese. In terms of the refugee definition, these two groups seem to fall
more clearly into the religion, race, and nationality bases of persecution
than into the social group category. Although there can be overlap
between the social group concept and the religion, race, and nationality
concepts, t3 7 the social group concept is most useful when it refers to
some basis for persecution that is not already covered by concepts of
race, religion, nationality, and/or political opinion.
After reviewing United Nations documents and United States judi-
cial and administrative opinions, Helton examines the sociological liter-
ature. He posits four types of social groups: statistical, societal, social,
and associational.s38 Statistical groups consist of individuals who share
a common characteristic, such as blue eyes or great height, but who lack
any consciousness of solidarity. 139 For Helton, the absence of a shared
consciousness removes statistical groups from the refugee definition
unless the persecuted characteristic is a covert method of persecution
based on race or ethnic background. 14O
135. Helton, supra note 17, at 50.
136. Persecution of military members and refugee workers might be animated by
the regime's perception that these group members possessed a political opinion
opposed to the regime's. United States law includes within the refugee definition
those who are persecuted based on political opinions they do not hold but that the
persecutor incorrectly ascribes to them. "[I]t is irrelevant whether a victim actually
possesses any of these opinions as long as the government believes that he does
.... " Hernandez v. Ortiz, 777 F.2d 509, 517 (9th Cir. 1985). See also Laza Majano v.
INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987); Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599 (9th
Cir. filed 1992).
This doctrine of imputed political opinion recognizes that persecution often occurs
based on general inferences, which may be wrong in particular circumstances. Broad
inferences about a group's loyalty to the regime, although quasi-political in nature,
often are the basis for persecution based on membership in a particular social group.
For example, the UNCHR Handbook states:
Membership of such a particular social group may be at the root of persecu-
tion because there is no confidence in the group's loyalty to the Government
or because the political outlook, antecedents or economic activity of its mem-
bers, or the very existence of the social group as such, is held to be an obsta-
cle to the Government's policies.
UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 46, para. 78.
137. It is expected that such overlap will often occur. Id. para. 77. See supra note
78.
138. Helton, supra note 17, at 51 n.85.
139. Id. at 51.
140. Id. To illustrate this last point, persecution in Vietnam against children with
blue eyes would most likely be a tacit act of racial persecution; children with blue eyes
are likely to have been sired by western fathers and to be despised because of their
parentage. Similarly, it is likely that persecution of tall people in Burundi would fall
heavily on one distinct descent group in the society, the Tutsi, and would thus func-
tion as a cover for persecution that is based on ethnic background. Graves, supra
note 19, at 782 n.256 (news reports of fighting between Tutsi (tall) and Hutu
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The second type of social group identified by Helton, the societal
group, consists of people who involuntarily share certain immutable
characteristics such as race, sex, or linguistic background. 14' Even
though these group members may vary enormously among themselves,
they share a consciousness of solidarity with others in their group, stem-
ming from the treatment the group receives from society at large. 14 2
For example, the history of racial discrimination in the United States
makes it likely that African-Americans, whether nuclear physicists or
unskilled laborers, will share a perception that they belong to a distinct
societal group.143
Social groups per se are voluntary and members do not necessarily
share similar immutable characteristics.144 Groups are based on shared
interests, which might be recreational, educational, cultural, geographi-
cal, and so on. Opera subscribers would fall into this category, as would
passengers on the same ship, classroom groups, friendship groups, and
neighborhood groups. 14 5 Helton believes that members of these
groups would fall within the refugee definition if their groups faced
persecution.
Associational groups are those that pursue a common goal. They
differ from social groups per se in that associational groups are formed
to achieve a common purpose rather than merely to share a social inter-
action.1 4 6 Again, membership is voluntary and group members share
interests, but they do not necessarily share similar immutable character-
istics. 1 4 7 Hehon identifies trade unions, universities, and the League of
Women Voters as prototypical associational groups,' 48 and thinks that
these groups also fit within the social group category in the refugee
definition.
(short)). See generally NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (1986) (bloody uprising in
1972 by the Hutu, who are short and stocky, 6 MICROPAEDIA [READY REFERENCE], at
177, against the dominant Tutsi, who are tall. 12 MICROPAEDIA [READY REFERENCE],
at 72).
141. Helton, supra note 17, at 51.
142. Id. at 52.
143. Although the example is one that would be included under the racial category
of persecution for purposes of the refugee definition, the same analysis would apply
to a non-racial societal group. For example, in the small African nation of Burundi,
two primary societal groups can be identified, the Tutsi and the Hutu. Both groups
are diverse, but each group shares a perception that they belong to a distinct societal
group. Blaine Harden, Burundi Killings' Roots Lie in Tribal Hatreds, WASH. POST, Aug.
21, 1988, at A25.
144. Helton, supra note 17, at 52.
145. Id. Helton includes kinship groups in this category. This seems incorrect in
that individuals have no control over the families into which they are born. Kinship
falls more appropriately into the second category, the societal group. To the extent
that a kinship group does not include all those of the same kinship, but rather
includes only that portion of the kinship group that chooses to interact together, then
it may satisfy the social group per se definition.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 52.
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Helton argues for an extremely broad reading of the social group
provision in the Refugee Act of 1980. He contends that "[m]embership
in virtually any group should be sufficient;"' t4 9 "the contours of a social
group for purposes of refugee status are limited only by the imagination
of the persecutor."' 5 0 Helton qualifies this statement, however, by indi-
cating that the social group term in the refugee statute contemplates a
legally identifiable group.' 5 1 In this context, "legally identifiable"
means a group that is not merely a statistical artifact. A legally identifi-
able group would either possess a particular attitude about society or be
perceived in a particular way by society at large. 15 2
Interestingly, Helton approvingly discusses a potential refugee
social group that does not appear to fit within the societal, social, or
associational groups he sets forth. This group consists of Salvadoran
urban working-class males of military age who have neither served in the
.military nor expressed overt support for the government.' 5 3 The indi-
viduals in this group involuntarily share certain characteristics, but they
are not immutable. Society at large does not treat them similarly. It is
unlikely they share a consciousness of solidarity. Accordingly, they do
not form a societal group. Similarly, they are too diverse to form a
social group based on shared interests, and they lack a common purpose
that might bring them together into an associational group. Instead,
they appear to comprise a statistical group: individuals who share a com-
mon characteristic but lack any consciousness of solidarity. As there is
no evidence that the poor treatment accorded to urban working-class
males of military age is a covert attempt to punish people for their race,
religion, or nationality, it seems that this group does not satisfy the
social group category in the refugee definition.
Other academic commentary in the United States also has urged a
broad interpretation of the social group provision of the Refugee Act of
1980. For example, Maureen Graves reviews both ordinary usage of the
term "social group" and its treatment in sociological literature, and con-
149. Id. at 60.
150. Id. at 66.
151. Id. at 61.
152. Id. In discussing the concept of a legally identifiable group, Helton reasons
by analogy from jury exclusion cases. A jury pool that excludes individuals with
names beginning with "T", "U", and "V" is deemed not to constitute a legally identi-
fiable group because there is no evidence that these individuals possess a different
attitude toward the law than those whose names begin with other letters. Id. at 60
n.128 (citing Krause v. Chartier, 406 F.2d 898 (1st Cir. 1969)). See also United States
v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 572 (Ist Cir. 1970). In contrast, a rule excluding women
from the jury pool affects a legally identifiable group. Helton, supra note 17, at 61
nn.135-36 (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979)). Although a wide range of
attitudes toward criminal law will be found among women, excluding all women will
tend to exclude some attitudes that are more common among women than among
men.
153. Id. at 62 (discussing the administrative proceedings in the case later appealed
to the Ninth Circuit as Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986)). See
infra note 268.
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cludes that it is impossible to fashion a satisfactory definition. 154 She
argues that the best that can result-an "amorphous, all-inclusive" defi-
nition-is not useful. 155 Eschewing attempts to formulate a general def-
inition, Graves focuses on particular examples of social groups
discussed in a non-refugee context. She points to social groups identi-
fied in U.S. government documents: the urban middle class, officer
corps, peasants, police, youth, ethnic Chinese, and Buddhist monks.' 56
She notes that these groups were not identified in a refugee context, but
rather were designated in a Pentagon commissioned psychological study
that attempted to identify social groups in Cambodia that would be sus-
ceptible to American pressure.' 5 7 Graves also reviewed some of the
sociological literature. She lists social groups identified by sociologists
according to the following factors: "kin, family, ethnic, territorial, age,
sex, political, governmental, language, religious, residential, class, occu-
pational, recreational, propinquity, business, nationality, scientific, char-
ity, insurance, educational, honorary, and learned."' 58
On the basis of these government and sociological studies, Graves
emphasizes that some of the groups are voluntary, others not; some are
cohesive, others not; some are homogeneous, others not; some involve
immutable characteristics, others not; some involve characteristics cen-
tral to the members' identities, others not.' 59 Declining to limit the
social group concept in refugee law to groups characterized by involun-
tary membership and immutable characteristics, Graves assumes that all
the social groups identified by sociologists and Pentagon studies fall
within the refugee definition. Because these sources present a great
variety of potential social groups, Graves concludes that it is impossible
to develop a precise definition of "social group" for refugee deci-
sions. 160 Instead she advocates a "broad, literal interpretation of 'social
group.' "161 She does not explain what this interpretation should be, 16 2
but indicates that the agency and courts should turn away from attempts
to formulate abstract definitions and instead recognize social groups on
a case by case basis. In recommending ad hoc decision-making about
154. Graves, supra note 19, at 787-89.
155. Id. at 790 n.305.
156. Id. at 789 n.297.
157. Id. The study was commissioned in 1959. Studies to identify "promising"
social groups have also been conducted by the Pentagon with respect to groups in
Egypt, Burma, China, Iran, Iraq, Laos, Syria, Thailand, and Vietnam. Id.
158. Id. at 790 n.305 (quoting R. BIERSTEDT, THE SOCIAL ORDER 258 (1957)).
159. Id. at 789-92.
160. Id. at 789. Furthermore, Graves argues that courts and administrative tribu-
nals lack the sophistication and expertise to analyze and apply many social group
definitions.
161. Id. at 795.
162. Graves instructs the courts to "[adhere] to the statutory meaning of 'social
group.'" Id. at 796. This is an empty phrase because there is no legislative history to
indicate what Congress intended this statutory term to mean. Accepting the premise
that Congress intended to broaden the refugee definition in 1980 does not logically
delineate which groups of potential refugees Congress envisioned as entitled to pro-
tection due to persecution based on membership in a social group.
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social groups, she apparently is confident that the judges will "know
them when they see them." 163
III. Jurisprudential Developments
Due to the vagueness of the social group term and the dearth of illumi-
nating legislative history, there have been fewer refugee status claims
based on social group than on other grounds, such as political opin-
ion, 164 and there are relatively few decisions in the United States and
Europe addressing the particular social group term. Furthermore, most
of the decisions that deal with social group claims also involve claims of
persecution based on religion or political opinion, and the great major-
ity of judicial decisions that discuss social group issues actually base
their conclusions on the religion and political opinion claims. 16 5
Although these decisions give little attention to the meaning of the term
social group, administrative and judicial tribunals in several countries
have grappled with the tasks of defining this term and applying it to
asylum seekers. These decisions provide comparisons and contrasts
that are instructive.
A. Germany
During the past decade, German courts have reviewed a growing
number of cases in which individuals claimed asylum based on persecu-
tion suffered due to their membership in a social group.' 66 The factual
situations giving rise to these claims varied dramatically. In the early
1980s a funeral home operator and his wife claimed the Polish authori-
ties harassed, extorted, and arrested them due to their involvement in
163. Cf Jacobellis v. United States, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
In despair at the difficulty of defining "hard-core pornography," Justice Stewart said,
"[p]erhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it
., ." Id.
164. See Blum, supra note 111, at 348 (categorizing Ninth Circuit cases by basis of
persecution). Blum's review indicates that most asylum seekers in the Ninth Circuit
rely on persecution based on political opinion; relatively few rely on persecution
based on social group. As the Ninth Circuit decides approximately 60% of the immi-
gration cases heard by federal courts of appeals, STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRA-
TION AND THEJUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 234 (1987), the
cases received by Blum are unlikely to constitute an isolated phenomenon.
165. Although political opinion as a basis of persecution appears to be more easily
identified and defined than persecution based on social group, the term "political
opinion" has generated its own definitional problems. For example, in Matter of
Acosta, Int. Dec. 2986 (BIA 1985), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ruled
that a taxi driver, persecuted for not obeying a general strike called by the guerrillas,
was not persecuted for his political opinion. The BIA held that the political motive of
the guerrillas to disrupt society by a general strike triggered the guerilla activity
against the taxi driver, and that this political motive did not constitute persecution on
account of political opinion. Id.
166. For a discussion of the asylum process in Germany and the judicial opinions
interpreting membership in a particular social group, see Fullerton, supra note 3.
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private enterprise.1 6 7 The couple argued that, although private eco-
nomic activity had not been criminalized, the state deemed entrepre-
neurs disloyal to and insufficiently controlled by the regime, and
consequently targeted them for persecution. The court granted asylum
in Germany based on persecution due to membership in the particular
social group of owners of private businesses.
In contrast, a German court denied asylum to a woman from India
who claimed she was persecuted because she had married out of caste
and because she was a member of a women's rights organization. 168
The court found credible the applicant's story of being disowned,
defamed, and threatened with death by stoning and fire, but it con-
cluded that this persecution could not be attributed to the government.
Although the opinion was somewhat opaque, the court appeared to
agree that the asylum seeker was perceived as a member of two social
groups, the group of women who marry men of another (and lower)
caste, and the group of women active in women's rights organizations.
The court also believed that she had suffered persecution. The court
concluded, however, that the government was not implicated in the per-
secution carried out by private citizens. 169 The court acknowledged that
the authorities had failed to protect the applicant, but decided that the
lack of police protection was probably due to inefficiency, mismanage-
ment, and corruption. Accordingly, the court denied asylum because
the applicant could not prove that the government inaction was due to
her membership in a particular social group.
In addition to these somewhat unusual claims of persecution, Ger-
man courts have adjudicated asylum claims based on persecution for
membership in more traditional social groups. For instance, the grand-
son of prosperous landowners in pre-revolutionary China 170 and the
daughter of landed gentry in pre-revolutionary Romania1 7 ' were both
granted asylum in Germany. Similarly, members of the Baganda people
in Uganda, who could show there was great resentment of the Baganda
and terror directed at them, established their claims for asylum based on
167. Judgment of March 29, 1985, No. 17 K 10.343/83, Venallungsgericht Gelsenkir-
chen [Gelsenkirchen Administrative Court].
168. Judgment ofJanuary 4, 1985, No. AN 1269-XII/79, 1'erwaltungsgericht Ansbach
[Ansbach Administrative Court].
169. In interpreting the term "persecution," which is a key part of the definition of
"refugee" contained in the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, the UNHCR Handbook notes: "Persecution is normally related to action by the
authorities of a country .... Where serious discriminatory or other offensive acts are
committed by the local populace, they can be considered as persecution if they are
knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if the authorities refuse, or prove unable,
to offer effective protection." UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 46, para. 65.
170. Judgment of March 29, 1983, No. AN 419-1/78 (XVI), I'erwaltungsgericht
Ansbach [Ansbach Administrative Court].
171. Judgment of December 10, 1982, No. 10 K 115/80, Ierwaltungsgericht Saarland
[Saarland Administrative Court].
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their social group.17 2 Kurdish and Afghani women whose husbands
were active opponents of the regime also successfully claimed asylum if
they provided evidence that the authorities often subjected family mem-
bers to severe treatment in order to flush out their opponents. The
women were seen as individuals persecuted on the basis of their family
membership. 173
Although the German judicial opinions discussed above examine
the asylum claims based on social group, the courts did not attempt to
define a social group for purposes of the asylum process. Rather, the
courts reached their decisions based on an intuitive sense of persecution
based on membership in a social group.1 74 Two German courts, how-
ever, have attempted to articulate standards for evaluating social group
claims. The Administrative Court of Hannover reviewed an asylum
claim submitted by a former government official from Ghana.175 The
applicant admitted that he had illegally sold government-owned ferti-
lizer to farmers at inflated prices and then fled Ghana after the leaders
of a coup began investigating corruption by former officials. He claimed
he would be persecuted in Ghana for his membership in the social group
composed of corrupt officials. He bolstered his creative, perhaps bra-
zen, claim by noting that the new government had selected a relatively
harmless groups of offenders, denied them appropriate legal proceed-
ings, subjected them to disproportionate penalties, and proclaimed a
"holy war" against them. He argued that although the corrupt activity
was illegal, those accused of non-violent, economic crimes were being
scapegoated for political ends. He asserted that in this setting the rela-
tively small group targeted constituted a particular social group.
While the court treated seriously the allegations of irregular legal
proceedings and disproportionate penalties, the court did not agree that
172. Judgment of April 7, 1983, No. 15 K 15316/80, Verwaltungsgericht Koln
[Cologne Administrative Court]; Judgment of November 29, 1983, No. AN 185 XIII/
79 (XIX), P'erwaltungsgericht Ansbach [Ansbach Administrative Court].
173. Judgment of July 2, 1985, No. 9 C. 35.84, Bundesverwaltungsgericht [Federal
Administrative Court] (Kurdish woman in Turkey); Judgment of February 21, 1985,
No. AN 19 K 84 C.837, Verwaltungsgericht Ansbach [Ansbach Administrative Court]
(Afghanistanian woman);Judgment of May 14, 1985, No. 20 A 10046/84, Oberverwal-
tungsgericht Nordrhein-Westfalen [North Rhine-Westphalia Administrative Appeals
Court] (Afghanistanian couple).
174. To an American lawyer trained in the common law tradition that honors pre-
cedent and stare decisis, many of the German judicial opinions in this area seem both
delphic and conclusory. The opinions seem to repeat the facts, review the expert
opinions, analyze the legal arguments presented by both sides, and then leap to a
conclusion. A discussion of the reasoning process that led to the conclusion is often
missing. A realization that the German legal system is a predicated on written legal
codes, that stare decisis is not important, and that the precedential value of judicial
decisions by trial courts is almost non-existent makes one realize why the decisions
often are conclusory. There is relatively little need for or value placed on well-rea-
soned and carefully analyzed trial court opinions in the German system. These opin-
ions have very few ramifications that extend beyond the particular litigants before the
court.
175. Judgment ofJune 6, 1984, No. 1 OVGA 91/82 As, Verwaltungsgericht Hannover
[Hannover Administrative Court].
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corrupt government officials formed a social group within the meaning
of the Geneva Convention. The court focused on two elements: (1) was
there a substantial degree of homogeneity among the individuals in the
group? (2) was there some degree of inner structure in the group? The
court concluded that individuals who did not necessarily even know each
other, and whose only similarity to each other was that they had commit-
ted economic crimes, did not satisfy either of the requirements., 76
The Administrative Court of Wiesbaden rejected the approach out-
lined by the Hannover court when it grappled with an asylum claim filed
by a homosexual man from Iran. 177 The asylum seeker had not suffered
persecution in the past. Raised in Iran in the Islamic tradition, he had
been allowed several times to depart freely from Iran and return at his
convenience. The regime did not know his sexual orientation. He was
concerned, nevertheless, that the Iranian government might learn about
his homosexuality and imprison or even execute him for ignoring reli-
gious laws. The Federal Refugee Office I78 in Germany rejected this asy-
lum claim due to lack of persecution in the past and lack of evidence that
the Iranian government was likely to learn of the asylum seeker's sexual
orientation.
The Wiesbaden court reversed the agency's decision. After con-
cluding that homosexuals are severely persecuted in Iran and that, con-
sequently, the asylum seeker would likely face persecution there, the
court examined whether homosexuals from Iran constitute a particular
social group within the meaning of the Geneva Convention. The court
expressly rejected the idea that group members must know one another
or belong to an organization. Instead the court emphasized two issues:
First, whether the general population views this collection of people as a
group; second, whether an objective observer of society would say that
the general population treats this group as undesirable. Looking at the
prejudice expressed against homosexuals in Iran, the pejorative labels
176. The court did state that in certain circumstances individuals accused of crimes
could constitute a particular social group within the meaning of the 1951 Geneva
Convention. A group of insignificant and harmless criminals who were treated in a
flagrantly illegal manner and subjected to greatly disproportionate punishment as a
means of diverting the public's hostility from the government to the scapegoated
group might satisfy the social group definition. Id. at 10.
177. Judgment of April 26, 1983, No. IV/I E 06244/81, Verwallungsgerichl liesbaden
[Wiesbaden Administrative Court].
178. Under the current refugee processing system in Germany, the Federal Office
for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees [Bundesamtffir die Anerkennung Auslindischer
Flffchtlinge] is the agency that evaluates asylum applications. Decisions by the Federal
Office can be appealed to the local Administrative Court [l'erwaltungsgericht]. There
are certain limited appeals from the Administrative Court to the Administrative
Appeals Court [Oberverwaltungsgericht or Verwaltungsgerichtshoj], and from there to the
Federal Administrative Court [Bundesverwaltungsgericht]. For a general description of
the asylum process, see Fullerton, supra note 3, at 391-94. The German asylum pro-
cedure will soon change dramatically, however. On May 28, 1993 the German Parlia-
ment voted to amend the constitution to limit drastically the opportunities to apply
for asylum. Bonn Bars Asylum Seekers, N.Y. TiMEs, May 29, 1993, at 3. See supra note
37.
Vol. 26
1993 A Comparative Look at Refugee Status
used to describe them, and the harsh treatment they suffer, the court
found that Iranian society perceives homosexuals as a pariah group, and
ruled that homosexuals in Iran constitute a particular social group
within the meaning of the 1951 Geneva Convention.
In summary, the two German courts that attempted to define the
social group term formulated two very different tests. The Hannover
court focused on the internal structure of the putative group, whereas
the Wiesbaden court focused on external perceptions-society's view of
the group in question. Because the role of precedent is not significant in
the German legal system, neither of the two trial courts attempted to
explain why its approach and rationale differed greatly from that prof-
fered by its sister court. Nor did the courts try to distinguish the facts of
the cases in order to synthesize the legal standards they had articulated.
Thus, the two different analytical approaches to the social group term in
the refugee definition co-exist in German judicial jurisprudence.
B. Canada
There are a number of decisions in Canada recognizing persecution
based on membership in a particular social group. Administrative tribu-
nals rendered the majority of the decisions, but there are also a few
reported judicial opinions. For example, in 1979 the Federal Court of
Appeal reviewed a claim filed by a young man from Chile who claimed
he had been persecuted for his membership in a sports club at his
secondary school. 179 Government authorities detained the applicant
and interrogated him about his activities as president of the club.
Despite the applicant's protest that the club was strictly a group engaged
in athletic activities, the officials described the club as one that sup-
ported socialism and accused him of joining the club for political
motives. The applicant also stated that his brother had been politically
active and feared that his family relationship by itself might lead to
persecution.
The court found the applicant credible and concluded that he had a
well-founded fear of persecution. The court then addressed, in a con-
clusory fashion, whether the basis for this persecution was the appli-
cant's membership in a particular social group. The applicant had
raised two possible social groups: (1) the sports club and (2) his family.
The court was uncomfortable with the notion that immediate family
might satisfy the social group term in the refugee definition and seemed
relieved that the sports club provided a convenient alternate basis.
Without articulating the basis for its hesitation over the family relation-
ship, the court simply stated: "[T]here can be no doubt that the 'Sports
Club' was a 'social group' as the term is used in the definition."'180
179. Astudillo v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, 31 Nat'l Rep. 121
(Oct. 5, 1979).
180. Id. Canadian law incorporates the Geneva Convention refugee definition. See
supra note 33.
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A decade later the Federal Court of Appeal revisited the social
group issue in a case involving a member of the Irish National Libera-
tion Army (INLA), who had fled Northern Ireland after defecting from
that organization. 1 8 1 After becoming a member of the INLA, a paramili-
tary organization dedicated to unifying Ireland, he was assigned to
guard two hostages, the young sister and step-father of an imprisoned
INLA member. When it appeared the imprisoned man had provided
evidence for the government, the INLA sentenced the hostages to
death. The asylum seeker helped the hostages escape, for which he was
sentenced to death by the INLA. He escaped to Canada where he
sought refugee status. 182
The court struggled with this case. Its difficulty stemmed from the
applicant's prior participation in terrorist activity. This triggered an
extended analysis of other elements of the refugee definition, in particu-
lar the requirement that an asylum seeker is unable or unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of his homeland.' 8 3 The majority concluded
that although the INLA constituted a social group, a terrorist organiza-
tion is not the sort of social group encompassed by the Geneva Conven-
tion refugee definition.' 8 4 The dissent pointed out that the social group
in question was not the INLA; it was, more precisely, former members of
the INLA. 18 5 The dissent argued that, when the focus shifted to former
181. Re Attorney-General of Canada and Ward, 67 D.L.R. 4th, 1 (Mar. 5, 1990)
(MacGuigan, J.A., dissenting in part).
182. He alleged that the INLA kidnapped him, tortured him, and sentenced him to
death. He then escaped and sought protection in the Republic of Ireland, where he
was imprisoned for his role in the original hostage-taking. When he was released
after two years and nine months, the Irish police supplied him with a passport and
airline tickets for Canada. Id. at 5.
183. For elements of the refugee division, see supra note 33.
184. The Wlard case was decided based on Canadian immigration legislation that
lacked provisions excluding from refugee status certain categories of people who
otherwise satisfied the refugee definition. Accordingly, individuals believed to have
committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and serious non-political crimes
outside the country of refuge, could seek admission if they could show they had a
well-founded fear of persecution. In contrast, Article IF of the Geneva Convention
provides:
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect
to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
(a) he has committed a crime against peace,a war crime, or a crime
against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up
to make provision in respect of such crimes;
(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country
of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;
(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of
the United Nations.
OnJanuary 1, 1989, Canadian law was amended to add these exclusion clauses to the
refugee definition applied in Canada. The Canadian refugee definition now
expressly excludes "any person to whom the Convention does not apply pursuant to
section E or F of Article 1 thereof .... " See supra note 33. Consequently, today in
Canada asylum seekers' former persecution of others would on its face preclude
them from satisfying the refugee definition.
185. W1'ard, 67 D.L.R. 4th, at 20 (MacGuigan, J.A., dissenting in part).
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INLA members, the nature of the INLA's activities was not directly rele-
vant to the claim before the court.
With so much focus on the moral culpability of terrorists and terror-
ist-turncoats, neither the majority nor dissent placed great emphasis on
the preliminary question: What constitutes a particular social group?
Nonetheless, both did, in passing, proffer a standard. After referring to
the UNHCR Handbook1 8 6 interpretation of "social group," the majority
somewhat surprisingly relied on a dictionary to conclude that a social
group is a number of persons who are "associated, allied, com-
bined."18 7 The dissent indicated that a social group is one that has
members "united in a stable association with common purposes." 18 8
The dissent further described the INLA as a "non-natural" social group,
using that awkward term to highlight that the INLA is a group that does
not share an innate characteristic such as race or nationality. It then
voiced a plea for a flexible definition:
There is in fact nothing absolute about social groups, particularly non-
natural social groups. They may have ideologies, but some members may
not adhere to them, belonging rather for reasons of prestige, or fear, or
some other non-ideological reason. Such groups may have membership
initiations or fees or lists, but many camp-followers may be drawn to their
side and be perceived as members by the world, but yet not be members
in the way others are. Such groups may be terrorist in intent, but never-
theless they may contain within their ranks those who are less given to
violence and even those who are dedicated to non-violence and universal
pacifism. Perhaps, above all, membership may be regarded as indelible
and forever, but some may drift away, or even break off suddenly for rea-
sons of principle. Should those who were briefly active in the Communist
Party in the thirties in a time of depression and despair be permanently
categorized as members of a subversive group? The concept of social
group should not, in my opinion, be wielded like a broad-sword to lop off
all individualizing circumstances within an arbitrarily designated circum-
ference. In a world fractured by racism and religion, politics and poverty,
reality is too complex to be thus limited by conceptual absolutes.' 8 9
Although eloquent, and a useful backdrop for asylum decisions, this
analysis provides no standard to guide decision-makers reviewing claims
of persecution based on membership in a particular social group.
In late 1992 the Federal Court of Appeal re-examined the social
group concept and, in dicta, offered another view of this term.' 9 0 The
refugee candidate was a woman from Trinidad and Tobago who claimed
she had been abused by her husband for years. Her complaints to the
police had been unavailing. After 15 years of this marriage, she fled to
Canada and sought asylum based on her persecution due to her mem-
186. See supra note 46.
187. SHORTER OXFORD DICTIONARY, second meaning. Ward, 67 D.L.R. 4th, at 8.
188. Id. at 18. The dissent does not indicate the source of this definitional test for
the term social group.
189. Id. at 19.
190. The Minister of Employment and Immigration v. Marcel Mayers, A-544-92
(Nov. 5, 1992).
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bership in the social group of Trinidadian women subject to wife
abuse.' 91 At issue before the Federal Court of Appeal was whether
there was some evidence to support the tribunal below, which had con-
cluded that this applicant might satisfy the refugee definition. 192
The court began its analysis of the meaning of "social group" in
refugee law by first reviewing its prior decision in Ward, which it found
did not set forth a workable test for social group claims. The court next
examined scholarly commentary on the term, some of the case law in the
United States,19 3 and administrative practice in Canada. The court then
offered its own statutory construction:
The phrase 'social group' has a broad meaning in its ordinary, dic-
tionary sense but it is, in the statute, modified by 'particular.' It seems to
me that the adjudicator could readily have decided that, even if a 'social
group', women, constituting as they do about half of humanity, cannot
aptly be described as a 'particular social group.' He might equally, on
that basis and in my view correctly, have decided that Trinidadian women
do not constitute a particular social group. Neither of those decisions
require more than construing the statute according to the ordinary mean-
ing of its words.
It is otherwise as to 'Trinidadian women subject to wife abuse.'
There is presently no judicial or other authority upon which the adjudica-
tor was obliged to rely that would lead him to a concluded opinion
whether, as a matter of law, they are a particular social group .... [T]o
construe the statute with a view to that determination requires the weigh-
ing of credible evidence in the form of foreign jurisprudence and learned
commentary. A question may be posed for the future: since, in this con-
text, persecution must be feared by reason of membership in a particular
social group, can fear of that persecution be the sole distinguishing factor
that results in what is at most merely a social group becoming a particular
191. The government defined the social group at issue as "Trinidadian women
subject to wife abuse." The asylum seeker agreed with that formulation, but also
offered two alternative views of the social group in question: "women" and
"Trinidadian women." Id. at 2.
192. The procedural posture of this case was somewhat unusual and it colored the
court's analysis. The case had initially been reviewed by a two-member "credible
basis panel." This tribunal consisted of an adjudicator and a member of the Cana-
dian Immigration and Refugee Board. Id. at 1. The adjudicator concluded that the
applicant was a credible witness and that there was some evidence that she would
satisfy the refugee definition. He did not address the specific statutory terms or the
definition of membership in a particular social group. The other member of the tri-
bunal, the Refugee Board member, reached the opposite conclusion on both issues.
He found the applicant not to be credible and concluded that her claim of persecu-
tion did not fall within the statutory definition. Id. at 1.
Under Canadian legislation the favorable decision of one member of the credible
basis panel is conclusive. Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1.7, s. 46.01(6). Because
the applicant was in a special group of backlog cases, the favorable decision of one
member of the panel authorized her admission to Canada. Immigration Act, c. 8(2).
See Marcel Mayers, A-544-92, at I n.3. As a result, the Federal Court of Appeal could
not review the issues de novo, but was limited to deciding whether there was some
evidence to support the adjudicator's conclusion.
193. The court looked only at Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir.
1986).
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social group?' 9 4
The court concluded by stating that:
[T]he adjudicator cannot be said to have erred in law by implicitly con-
cluding that the Refugee Division might find "Trinidadian women subject
to wife abuse" to be a particular social group.... That is not to say that
the Refugee Division would be right if it so decided but only that the...
tribunal had not the authority to pursue the questions. 19 5
With this delphic utterance, the Federal Court of Appeal affirmed the
decision below. The language is so opaque, and the procedural posture
of the case so convoluted, 19 6 that it is difficult to predict what effect this
opinion will have on the development of the social group concept in
Canadian jurisprudence.
In addition to the Federal Court of Appeal decisions discussed
above, there are many other Canadian decisions involving persecution
based on membership in a particular social group. The Immigration
and Refugee Board 19 7 has been quite active, recognizing the refugee
status of Freemasons in Cuba,' 9 8 members of the capitalist class,' 99
members of the landlord class, 200 Salvadoran farmers living in areas of
military operations by both government and guerrilla forces, 20 ' draft-
evaders and deserters from military forces whose actions have been con-
demned by the international community, 20 2 and Tamils from Sri
Lanka. 20 3 In addition, the Immigration and Refugee Board, and its
predecessor the Immigration Appeal Board,20 4 have recognized social
groups defined by family background, 20 5 gender,20 6 and sexual orienta-
194. Marcel Mayers, A-544-92, at 11-12.
195. Id. at 13.
196. See supra note 192.
197. In the late 1980s Canada revised its refugee determination process. The new
process channeled all claims to refugee status in Canada to the Convention Refugee
Determination Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB). Bill C. 55, cl.
19 (codified at Immigration Act sec. 71.1). The Immigration and Refugee Board also
supersedes the Immigration Appeal Board (IAB), which under earlier legislation
reviewed appeals from denials of refugee status. Carolyn Patty Blum, Refugee Status
Based on Membership in a Particular Social Group: A North American Perspective, in ASYLUM
LAW AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 93 n.69 (Jacqueline Bhabba &
Geoffrey Coll eds., 1992).
198. CRDD T89-03344, Feb. 5, 1990.
199. CRDD T89-00106, June 7, 1989.
200. CRDD T89-02116, May 23, 1989.
201. CRDD T89-02579, Dec. 8, 1989.
202. CRDD T89-03954, Mar. 16, 1990.
203. IRB Decision M89-01213,June 1989, R.L.R.U. Cat. Sig.10240; IRB Decision
M89-00407, July 1989, R.L.R.U. Cat. Sig. 10147; IRB Decision M89-01225, July
1989, R.L.R.U. Cat. Sig. 10017, cited in HATHAWAY, supra note 59, at 163 n.189.
204. The Immigration Act of 1976, ch. 52, § 70(1), 1976-1977 S.C. at 1233, pro-
vided those applicants denied refugee status with a right to seek a redetermination
before the Immigration Appeal Board (IAB).
205. E.g., CRDD T90-02208, Aug. 16, 1990; CRDD T90-02209, Aug. 16, 1990;
CRDD T89-01691, Jan. 8, 1990; CRDD C89-00036, June 16, 1989; CRDD C89-
00037, June 16, 1989; CRDD M89-00971, June 13, 1989; CRDD M89-00972, June
Cornell International Law Journal
tion. 20 7 For example, the Board has deemed single women living in a
Moslem country without the protection of a male relative, 208 homosex-
ual men from Argentina and Russia,20 9 and young men of eligible age
for military duty who are subject to mistreatment after indiscriminate
recruitment 210 to be members of persecuted social groups. Most
recently, the Minister for Education and Immigration reversed the
Immigration and Refugee Board and granted asylum to a Saudi woman
who claimed persecution based on her sex.2 "1 She asserted that she
feared persecution based on her membership in the social group of
emancipated women: those who refused to wear the veil, who attempted
to travel alone, and who tried to pursue a university education in the
field of their choice.21 2
Although all of these decisions are interesting, none contains analy-
sis of the elements that define a particular social group. In recognition
of this omission, the Immigration and Refugee Board has released a
position paper containing an analytical framework to guide decision-
makers who review claims of persecution based on membership in a
social group. 2 13 The Board's analysis looks to the internal cohesiveness
of the group and to external perceptions of the group.21 The sug-
gested framework proposes a two-part test for determining the existence
of a social group. Each part of the test, in turn, has multiple sub-parts.
The test first inquires whether the alleged social group is defined by
an internal characteristic. 2 15 The organizing characteristic of the partic-
ular group might be innate, such as race, gender or kinship. Alterna-
tively, the shared characteristic might be immutable, though not innate.
For example, group members might share a common past economic or
social status-a status that cannot be changed. Another shared internal
characteristic might be one that is fundamental to the members' identity
13, 1989; CRDD M89-00425, Apr. 13, 1989; CRDD M89-00131, Apr. 7, 1989; CRDD
M89-00146, Feb. 27, 1989.
206. CRDD M89-01959, Sept. 8, 1989; CRDD M89-01225, July 11, 1989; CRDD
T89-00587, June 16, 1989; CRDD M89-00638, May 3, 1989.
207. CRDD T91-04459, Apr. 9, 1992; CRDD M91-12609, June 2, 1992.
208. In re Incirciyan, No. M87-1541X and M87-1248, Aug. 10, 1987 (Immigration
Appeal Board).
209. See supra note 207.
210. In re Valladares Escotes, No. T87-9024X, July 29, 1987 (Immigration Appeal
Board). Although the IAB recognized the existence of a bona fide social group
within the meaning of the refugee definition, the IAB did not find the applicant credi-
ble and, as a result, denied his application for refugee status.
211. Decision of Bernard Valcourt, Minister of Employment and Immigration, Jan.
29, 1993; Clyde H. Farnsworth, Anti-Woman Bias May Bring Asylum, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
2, 1993, at A8; Clyde H. Farnsworth, Saudi Woman Who Fled Predicts Crackdoun, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 1993, at 19.
212. See supra note 211.
213. Preferred Position Paper, "Membership in a Particular Social Group as a
Basis for a Well-Founded Fear of Persecution," Immigration and Refugee Board,
Ottawa, Canada, Mar. 1992.
214. Id. at 8.
215. Id. at 10.
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or to their human dignity. The religious affiliation of the group mem-
bers might fall into this category.
The standard also examines any existing external perceptions of the
group.2 16 The test queries whether those outside the group perceive
the group as threatening danger-a perceived danger that may, but does
not have to, be political. The standard also inquires into external per-
ceptions about the very existence of a group. If the government believes
that certain individuals form a group, but no group exists, and perse-
cutes them for their alleged membership, the individuals could claim
persecution based on membership in a particular social group.
In summary, the Immigration and Refugee Board's position paper
suggests a dual approach to determine the existence of a social group
within the meaning of the 1951 Geneva Convention. Courts and other
tribunals should ask whether the members of the alleged group are
bound together by an internal characteristic that is innate, immutable,
or fundamental to the members' identity or human dignity.
Decision-makers should not limit themselves to internal group char-
acteristics, however. They should also examine external perceptions. If
forces in a society mistakenly believe that a group exists, and act on that
belief, any persecution that follows would be deemed persecution based
on membership in a social group. Similarly, if forces in society correctly
believe that a group exists, but incorrectly attribute dangers and threats
to the group, any resulting persecution would constitute persecution
due to membership in a social group.
From a comparative perspective, the Canadian Board's approach
echoes the approach taken by the German courts. Although there is no
indication that the Board is familiar with the German judicial opinions
described above, the Board's focus on both internal group characteris-
tics and external perceptions of purported groups, joins the two stan-
dards suggested by the German courts. Importantly, the Board's
analysis expressly views the two standards-the internal group charac-
teristic and the external perception of the group-as alternative options.
Each standard is sufficient on its own to define a social group within the
meaning of refugee law. Furthermore, the sub-parts of the Board's stan-
dard are also alternative options. An applicant for refugee status only
needs to satisfy one of the sub-categories of either of the two prongs of
the test in order to prove a social group that meets the refugee law
definition.
C. United States
In the United States, only a small number of asylum seekers base their
claims on persecution due to membership in a particular social group.
Nonetheless, their claims have been premised on persecution based
on -membership in a great variety of social groups: taxi drivers in El
216. Id.
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Salvador, 2 17 the military in Guatemala, 2 18 the educated elite in
Ghana,2 19 hereditary chiefs of the Esubete people in Nigeria, 2 20 young
working class males of military age in El Salvador, 2 2 1 the social circle of
Imelda Marcos in the Philippines, 22 2 large landowners in the Philip-
pines,2 23 cheesemakers in El Salvador,2 24 families, 2 25 women previously
217. Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. 2986 (BIA 1985).
218. Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 925 F.2d 1177 (9th Cir. 1991), superseded by
Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 937 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1991). The applicant claimed that
his former service in the military would trigger persecution by both the guerrillas and
the military. The court concluded that the military was not a social group within the
meaning of the refugee definition. The claim was essentially based on fear of perse-
cution for political opinion.
219. Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985).
220. Adebisi v. INS, 952 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1992). The asylum seeker was a hered-
ity chief of the Esubete, a sub-tribe of the Yoruba. He feared persecution by a faction
of the Esubete. The immigration judge concluded that the applicant feared persecu-
tion due to his membership in a social group, the Esubete royal family, but that he
had failed to show that the government was unable or unwilling to protect him from
the persecution. The BIA ruled that the fear of persecution was based on a personal
dispute, not on membership in a social group. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the
Esubete royal family might constitute a social group, but that the asylum seeker's fear
was not based on his membership in the social group, but rather based on his failure
to accept a position of leadership in the group.
221. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
222. Rodriguez v. INS, No. 91-70226, 1992 WL 116029 (9th Cir. May 29, 1992).
The asylum seeker alleged persecution based on her membership in the inner social
circle of Marcos and based on her membership in the Blue Ladies, a group that
assisted Imelda Marcos in social and philanthropic activities. The court concluded
that the Blue Ladies constituted an identifiable social group, but that Marcos' inner
circle was too amorphous to constitute an identifiable social group. Moreover, the
alleged harassment failed to rise to the level of persecution.
223. Gatchalian v. INS, No. 90-70204, 1991 WL 92349 (9th Cir. May 31, 1991)
(asylum seeker, while manager of relative's large farm in Philippines, received threats
from New Peoples Army; court ruled applicant failed to show reasonable possibility
of persecution).
224. Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990). An asylum seeker made
campesino cheese, which is attractive to guerrillas because it is resistant to spoilage.
He provided cheese when guerrillas demanded it, and feared persecution by the gov-
ernment. The BIA concluded cheesemakers do not constitute a social group. The
First Circuit affirmed the decision, finding no likelihood of persecution by govern-
ment). Contra Case No. A26-201-249, Executive Office for Immigration Review
(EOIR), Baltimore, Md., Nov..2, 1983 (asylum granted to cheesemaker who sold
cheese to guerrillas when other cheesemakers in vicinity had been murdered).
225. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting young
urban working-class males of military age as cognizable social group; describing in
dicta a family as the quintessential social group). Courts reviewing claims of persecu-
tion based on family membership have tended to disagree. See, e.g., Estrada-Posadas
v. INS, 924 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting Guatemalan woman's claim of perse-
cution due to family membership where her cousin had been kidnapped and her
uncle killed; held that Congress did not intend to grant refugee status based on fam-
ily membership). See also De Valle v. INS, 901 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1990) (Salvadoran
woman's claim that she belonged to social group consisting of military deserters'
family members was rejected because the group members were not closely affiliated
and did not form a discrete group); Sarabia-Chica v. INS, 908 F.2d 977 (9th Cir.
1990) (Salvadoran woman alleged persecution based on membership in her family,
which included many who had been killed for their political activities; court ruled she
was eligible for asylum based on political opinion grounds and did not reach her
Pol. 26
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raped and beaten by guerrilla forces, 2 26 and homosexual men. 22 7 Many
of the opinions, however, fail to analyze the concept of membership in a
social group and focus instead on other aspects of the asylum claim. For
example, they base their conclusions on issues such as the reasonable
likelihood of persecution, the credibility of the asylum seeker, and the
political opinion of the applicant.
Five reported decisions do struggle to define "social group" under
the refugee definition. Each decision is flawed, but for different reasons.
Examining them together reveals conflicts in the U.S. jurisprudence in
this area. In Matter of Acosta,228 the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) 22 9 reviewed an asylum claim by a Salvadoran taxi driver. Mr.
Acosta had driven a taxi in San Salvador, where he helped organize and
manage COTAXI, a cooperative of taxi drivers. 230 The cooperative ran
into trouble with the guerrillas in El Salvador, who planned a series of
work stoppages in their efforts to overthrow the Salvadoran govern-
ment.2 31 Despite anonymous requests to COTAXI to cease work,23 2
Acosta and his taxi cooperative decided to keep working. COTAXI was
threatened with retaliation, and taxis were seized and burned. Worse,
five COTAXI drivers were killed in their taxis. Three of them were co-
founders and officers of COTAXI. Each of the three had received an
anonymous threatening note before his death. 233 Acosta himself found
social group claim); Olmedo-Carrillo v. INS, 908 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1990) (Salvado-
ran man who claimed persecution due to his membership in his family, his group of
friends, and a consumer cooperative failed to show a reasonable possibility of
persecution).
226. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2nd Cir. 1991) (women who have previously
been raped and beaten by guerrillas do not constitute a social group because they are
not a recognizable and discrete group).
227. In Matter of Toboso, A23 220 644 (Feb. 3, 1986), aj'd Matter of Toboso, No.
A23 220 644 (BIA Mar. 12, 1990) (homosexuals in Cuba suffer pattern of discrimina-
tion and persecution due to common immutable characteristic).
228. Int. Dec. 2986 (BIA 1985).
229. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is the administrative appeals tribu-
nal within the United States Department of Justice, with jurisdiction over decisions
entered by immigration judges. The BIA is a creature of regulation, promulgated
pursuant to the Attorney General's power to hear appeals from exclusion decisions
by immigration judges, 8 U.S.C. § 226(b) (1988). Regulations provide that deporta-
tion decisions may be appealed to the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 242.21. See ALEINIKOFF &
MARTIN, supra note 41, at 91-93, for an overview of the BIA's role.
230. Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. 2986, at 8 (BIA 1985). Acosta testified by affidavit
that he and several others founded COTAXI in 1976. Acosta held COTAXI manage-
rial positions between 1978 and 1981; from 1979 to early 1981, he was general man-
ager. COTAXI, a cooperative organization designed to help its members purchase
their own taxicabs, was one of five taxi cooperatives in San Salvador. Many other taxi
cooperatives flourished throughout the country of El Salvador. Id.
231. Id. at 8-9. Although the immigration judge hearing Acosta's case concluded
that a large part of Acosta's testimony was self-serving and not worthy of belief, the
BIA rejected the judge's reasoning and found Acosta credible. Id. at 10.
232. COTAXI members believed the anonymous requests came from anti-govern-
ment guerrillas, because the guerrillas attempted to damage the economy of El Salva-
dor by disrupting small businesses in the transportation industry. Id. at 8.
233. The opinion does not describe the text of the notes. The opinion states that
one of the three founders of COTAXI killed in their cabs stated, before he died, that
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death threats in his taxicab, 23 4 and was assaulted in his cab. He decided
to flee for his life.
After arriving in the United States, Acosta sought asylum based on
his membership in a particular social group and based on his political
opinion.23 5 Specifically, he claimed that he feared persecution by the
guerrillas 23 6 based on his membership in the social group "comprised
of COTAXI drivers and persons engaged in the transportation industry
of El Salvador."' 23 7 The BIA rejected Acosta's claim. Putting aside for
the moment the BIA's questionable ruling that persecution for refusal to
participate in a general strike does not constitute persecution based on
political opinion, 23 8 it is important to note that the BIA did not appear
"three men identifying themselves as guerrillas hadjumped into his taxi, demanded
possession of his car, and announced they were going to kill him." Id. at 8. This
statement reveals no indication that the abductors were going to kill him because he
was a member of COTAXI, but rather because he owned a car that they wanted to
take. It was not clear from the opinion whether questioning by the immigration
judge or by the attorneys present at the hearing revealed that some portion of this
dying declaration indicated that the abduction was targeted at COTAXI.
234. He received the notes over a two-month period. The first one stated, "Your
turn has come, because you are a traitor." The second note stated, "You are on the
black list." The third note stated, "We are going to execute you as a traitor." The
first and third notes were addressed to "the manager of COTAXI." Id. at 9.
235. Id. at 29.
236. Although the more typical asylum seeker alleges that he suffers persecution
by the government, both the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1980 Refugee Act of
the United States recognize persecution by a non-government group that the govern-
ment knows about and is unwilling or unable to control. For example, the UNHCR
Handbook, which states criteria for determining refugee status under the 1951 Con-
vention, specifies that in addition to persecution by "the authorities of a country [per-
secution] may also emanate from sections of the population that do not respect the
standards established by the laws of the country concerned .... Where serious dis-
criminatory or other offensive acts are committed by the local populace, they can be
considered as persecution if they are knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if the
authorities refuse, or prove unable, to offer effective protection." UNHCR HAND-
BOOK, supra note 46, para. 65. United States law is in accord. E.g., Bolanos-Her-
mandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1984), as amendedon denial of reh'g and of reh 'g
en banc, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1985) (asylum seeker who refused to join guerillas or
army had well-founded fear of persecution from both sides due to his neutrality).
237. Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. 2986, at 29 (BIA 1985).
238. Id. at 32. In stating that Acosta could escape persecution "either by changing
jobs or cooperating in work stoppages," id. at 32, the BIA gave a very cramped read-
ing to the term "persecution on account of political opinion." When Acosta refused
to join the strike called by the guerrillas, he expressed a political opinion. He also
may have been expressing a desire to earn money, but surely he "voted with his cab"
against the guerrillas when he went to work during the general strike called by the
guerrillas. That Acosta acted on his resolve, rather than writing about it or speaking
about it, certainly does not preclude him from obtaining refugee status when he flees
persecution based on his political opinion. See also Bolanos-Hernandez, 749 F.2d at
1324, for a discussion of circumstances in which neutrality, or the decision not to ally
oneself to a political viewpoint, constitutes a "political opinion" within the meaning
of the United States refugee law.
If the BIA's comment about escaping persecution by cooperating with the poten-
tial persecutor were taken seriously, this view would effectively repeal the "political
opinion" category of refugees. Most governments and other political groups that
engage in persecution based on political opinion will desist from persecution if the
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to doubt Acosta's testimony.23 9 Rather, the BIA accepted the credibility
of Acosta's evidence but concluded that Acosta's participation in the taxi
cooperative did not constitute membership in a particular social group.
In order to reach that conclusion, the BIA grappled with the defini-
tion of "particular social group." Noting that there has been little expli-
cation of this term in either U.S. or international law, the BIA noted that
the other four bases of persecution recognized under the refugee defini-
tion-race, religion, nationality, and political opinion-are less vague
than membership in a particular social group. Accordingly, the BIA
decided to turn for guidance in interpreting the "particular social
group" to e'usdem generis, the canon of statutory construction that directs
that general words included in a list of more specific words be construed
in a manner consistent with the more specific words.2 40
Analyzing the four specific bases of persecution, the BIA concluded
that each of them describes persecution targeted at a characteristic that
"either is beyond the power of an individual to change or is so funda-
mental to individual identity or conscience that it ought not be required
to be changed. ' 24 1 Inaccurately labeling both alternatives as immutable
characteristics, 2 42 the BIA held that a particular social group is a group
of individuals who share a "common immutable characteristic":
The shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or
kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experi-
ence such as former military leadership or land ownership. The particu-
lar kind of group characteristic that will qualify under this construction
dissident effectively repudiates his past disagreement with the persecutor and coop-
erates with the persecutor in the future. Therefore, all political dissidents would be
able to escape persecution if they only cooperated in the approved political actions.
The BIA seems to indicate that individuals must do what they can to avoid persecu-
tion, including acting contrary to their beliefs.
If one argues that the protection afforded by the Refugee Act of 1980 for those
persecuted on account of their political opinion mandates that political dissidents
need not cooperate with their would-be persecutors, then one must explain why
Acosta is not a political dissident. Surely, the fact that he was not a well-known polit-
ical figure should not preclude him from obtaining refugee status when he flees per-
secution on account of his political opinion.
239. Most of the evidence consisted of testimony by Acosta. This raised the issue
of the extent to which the testimony was self-serving. The immigration judge con-
cluded that Acosta's testimony was sufficient to prove that he was a founder and
member of COTAXI, but insufficient to prove that Acosta had suffered death threats
and assaults. Although the immigration judge did not find that Acosta lacked credi-
bility, he rejected much of Acosta's testimony as self-serving. Matter of Acosta, Int.
Dec. 2986, at 10 (BIA 1985). The BIA reversed this ruling. Emphasizing that there
had been no finding that Acosta lacked credibility, the BIA pointed out that his testi-
mony had been detailed, logically consistent, and supported by objective evidence
from other sources that corroborated Acosta's membership in COTAXI and the
threats made by the guerrillas to public transportation. In these circumstances, the
BIA found that Acosta's testimony was worthy of belief. Id.
240. Id. at 30. This is the doctrine of ejusdem generis, meaning "of the same kind".
See 2 A. C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (4th ed. 1972).
241. Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. 2986, at 30-31 (BIA 1985).
242. Immutable means "unchangeable; not subject to variation in different cases."
OXFORD ILLUSTRATED DICTIONARY 421 (2d ed., 1975).
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remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis. However, whatever the
common characteristic that defines the group, it must be one that the
members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to
change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or
consciences. 243
Thus, the BIA adopted a two-pronged approach to the interpreta-
tion of "particular social group." For purposes of U.S. asylum law, a
particular social group consists either of individuals who share an immu-
table characteristic or share a characteristic that is not immutable but is
so fundamental to their identity that they should not have to change that
characteristic.
Having articulated this test for "particular social group," the BIA
attempted to apply this test to the facts in the Acosta case. The BIA first
categorized Acosta as a member of a taxi cooperative that refused to
strike. The BIA did acknowledge that the guerrillas in San Salvador per-
secuted taxi cooperatives, including COTAXI, that did not participate in
work stoppages. Despite acknowledging that Acosta was a member of a
recognizable group that had been subjected to persecution, the BIA
concluded the group to which Acosta belonged did not constitute a par-
ticular social group within the meaning of the Refugee Act of 1980. The
BIA stated that being a taxi driver was not immutable; the drivers could
change jobs. The BIA also said that refusing to take part in work stop-
pages was not immutable; the drivers could always cooperate with the
strike. "It may be unfortunate," said the BIA, "that [Acosta] either
would have had to change his means of earning a living or cooperate
with the guerrillas in order to avoid their threats. However, the interna-
tionally accepted concept of a refugee simply does not guarantee an
individual a right to work in the job of his choice."'2 44
The BIA mischaracterized Acosta's claim. The seriousness of
Acosta's potential plight and the complexity of this aspect of refugee law
deserve more reflective analysis. Contrary to the BIA's implication,
Acosta did not claim that either international or United States law guar-
antees individuals the unqualified right to work at the job of their
choice. 245 Acosta simply testified that by carrying out the job he had
managed to find in an economy suffering from high unemployment 24 6
243. Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. 2986, at 31 (BIA 1985). In analyzing "particular
social group" the BIA reviewed the history of this term in the Geneva Convention,
supra note 12, and Protocol, supra note 15, and examined the work of commentators
who have discussed the legal definition of refugee. Finding the evidence inconclu-
sive, the BIA turned to the eusdenz generis doctrine, as a tool of interpretation. This
doctrine instructs that general terms used in an enumeration with specific terms
should be construed in a manner consistent with the specific terms. Matter of Acosta,
Int. Dec. 2986, at 30 (BIA 1985).
244. Id. at 32.
245. There is no indication that anyone other than members of the BIA raised this
"right to ajob of his choice" claim. The claim is so unpersuasive that it is difficult to
imagine Acosta raising it.
246. El Salvador experienced unemployment rates as high as 50%-60% into the
early 1980s. 4 MICROPAEDIA [READY REFERENCE] 414, THE NEw ENCYCLOPAEDIA
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he had received serious death threats from a group that apparently had
no difficulty in making such threats come true. The BIA's evaluation of
Acosta's particular social group claim was narrow and elitist, and the
BIA vividly demonstrated how cramped an interpretation is possible
under its proposed definition.
The BIA's application of the "immutable" and the "fundamental to
identity or conscience" aspects of its "particular social group" definition
reveals serious problems with its approach. The lens through which the
BIA examined Acosta's claim for "immutable" characteristics was a nar-
row one. Despite the BIA's explanation that the immutable aspects of a
particular social group may extend beyond characteristics determined at
birth to include elements of an individual's personal history, such as for-
mer military leadership or former land ownership, the BIA did not
extend its analysis far into Acosta's past. Specifically, the BIA did not
consider Acosta's past as a founder of a taxi cooperative that defied the
calls for work stoppages and his past as a driver who refused to comply
with the strikes called by the guerrillas.247 Clearly, a taxi driver can no
more change his past than can a former military leader or a former land
owner.
248
More significantly, the BIA did not apply to Acosta's testimony the
"matter of conscience" aspect of its social group definition. The BIA
did not even examine whether members of a work cooperative might
find that their membership is fundamental to their identities and to their
views of themselves as members of society. This failure of examination
by the BIA demonstrated a significant class bias in the BIA's view of
social group. For example, the BIA decided in Acosta that taxi drivers
resisting work stoppages can be required to change their views and
actions when faced with threats of persecution, but it is difficult to imag-
ine that the BIA would come to the same conclusion if the facts indi-
cated that doctors throughout the city of San Salvador were routinely
persecuted for practicing medicine. 249 Similarly, if lawyers in San Salva-
BRITANNICA (15th ed. 1986). See also UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, EL SALVADOR: A
COUNTRY STUDY (Richard A. Haggerty ed., 1988) (30% unemployment and 20%
underemployment in early 1980s).
247. The BIA focused instead on the possibility that Acosta might find a job in
another city, noting that there was no evidence that the persecution of taxi drivers in
San Salvador existed throughout the country. Matter of Acosta, Int. Dec. 2986, at
33-34 (BIA 1985).
248. It is possible that the BIA failed to consider Acosta's past due to a failure of
proof by Acosta that the guerrillas continued to persecute members of COTAXI after
they stopped driving their cabs. The tenor of the BIA's opinion, however, implied
that the past experience of something as common as a taxicab driver did not rise to
the level of the past experience of a military leader or a land owner.
249. This is not unimaginable. One of the notorious excesses of the Cultural
Revolution in China was the condemnation of doctors, many of whom were sent to
the remote countryside where they were ordered to live like peasants. See CHANG,
supra note 56, at 425-27. In a similar vein, when the Khmer Rouge took over Cambo-
dia in 1975, it exiled all city-dwellers to the countryside and persecuted the profes-
sional and educated classes. WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, SIDESHOW: KISSINGER, NIXON AND
THE DESTRUCTION OF CAMBODIA 368 (1979). See generally FRANCOIS PONCHAUD, CAM-
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dor risked death by practicing law or university professors were
threatened with death for holding classes, it is hard to imagine the BIA
blithely saying that it is unfortunate that these groups of individuals
have to change jobs, but they have no right under international law to
do the work of their choice.250 Undoubtedly, doctors, lawyers, and
professors all are in occupations that require more training than that
necessary for taxi drivers. More education and training does not guar-
antee, however, more commitment to work. Nor is more highly skilled
and more highly paid work necessarily more fundamental to one's iden-
tity. The testimony recounted in the Acosta opinion does not indicate
whether Acosta saw his work as fundamental to his identity. His actions
as a founder and active member of the COTAXI cooperative suggest
that for him his work may have been more than "just ajob." Whether or
not this is so, the BIA's failure to inquire into the significance of Acosta's
membership in COTAXI to his self-definition essentially omitted the
"fundamental to identity" prong from the BIA's particular social group
definition. 25 '
In Ananeh-Firempong v. INS,2 5 2 the First Circuit took a more gener-
ous approach to claims of persecution based on membership in a partic-
ular social group. Beatrice Ananeh-Firempong had come to the United
States from Ghana as a student. She overstayed her student visa 2 53 and,
in 1982, was found deportable. In opposing deportation, she claimed
that she would face persecution on account of her social group if she
were sent back to Ghana.2 54 She alleged that she would be persecuted
BODIA: YEAR ZERO (1978); U.S. GOVERNMENT, CAMBODIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 46-51
(1990).
250. Of course, neither international nor United States law guarantees the right to
the job of one's choice, but that begs the question of whether doctors persecuted for
being doctors, lawyers persecuted for being lawyers, engineers persecuted for being
engineers, and so on, can constitute a social group within the meaning of the Refu-
gee Act of 1980.
251. Another disturbing aspect of Acosta is the cavalier way in which individuals are
told to avoid persecution by giving up a job in a society where unemployment is
rampant and bedrock poverty abounds. If significant other employment opportuni-
ties are available, this admonition might be tolerable. When giving up yourjob leads
to malnutrition and penury, the cost of avoiding persecution is too high. See Kovac v.
INS, 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969) (under predecessor statute to Refugee Act of 1980,
loss of job can constitute persecution).
252. 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985).
253. United States immigration law provides that certain non-citizens can obtain
student visas to come to the United States on a temporary basis. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1 101(a)(15)(F) (1988). To be eligible for student visas, applicants must have a for-
eign residence that they have no intention of abandoning and must intend to leave
the United States when they finish their course of study. Students who remain in the
United States after their student visas expire have violated the immigration law and
are deportable. 8 U.S.C. § 125(a)(9)(A) (1988). See Shahla v. INS, 749 F.2d 561 (9th
Cir. 1984) (alien's admission that he had not departed the United States when his
authorization lapsed is clear and convincing evidence of deportability).
254. After being found deportable, the applicant asked the INS to reopen her case
to allow her to seek relief from deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 125(h) (1988), the stat-
utory provision that forbids deportation to countries where the alien's life or free-
dom would be threatened due to race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
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for belonging to the following social groups: the Ashanti tribe,255 the
educated class of professionals and business people, 256 and those asso-
ciated with the recently overthrown government. 257 The evidence
presented by Ananeh-Firempong indicated that she came from a well-
educated family in Ghana. Her father was a headmaster of a school sys-
tem in Ghana. He owned his own house in Ghana, had substantial sav-
ings, and lived in a prosperous neighborhood. In addition, he had been
a close friend of the former head of government. Indeed, he had been
an active and prominent member of the Convention Peoples Party, the
party in control prior to the coup d'etat by Rawlings in 1981.258 Ananeh-
Firempong testified that in 1982, in the aftermath of two coup attempts
against Rawlings, her parents were placed under house arrest, their tele-
phone service was disrupted, their mail was intercepted, and their bank
account was seized. She testified that a government soldier had severely
beaten her nephew who was staying at her parents' house. She intro-
duced evidence that the government viewed professionals and business
people as disloyal, and as likely sympathizers with the overthrown gov-
ernment. She indicated that the Rawlings government similarly viewed
the Ashanti as suspect.
In order to decide whether Ananeh-Firempong had stated a claim
that her life or freedom would be threatened in Ghana on account of
membership in a social group, the First Circuit had to define social
group. The court turned for guidance to the Handbook on Procedures and
social group. The immigration judge granted the motion to reopen. The Board of
Immigration Appeals reversed, stating that applicant failed to present a prima facie
case she would face persecution if deported to Ghana. The First Circuit, in turn,
reversed the BIA, concluding she had presented a prima facie case. Ananeh-
Firempong, 766 F.2d at 622.
255. The opinion refers to the Ashanti "tribe." Others refer to this group as the
Ashanti people, noting that tribes are groups of "primitive or barbarous clans,"
OXFORD ILLUSTRATED DICTIONARY 907 (2d ed., 1975), whereas the Ashanti are heirs
of a sophisticated and complex civilization. The Ashanti empire occupied a region in
western Africa from the Togo Mountains in the east to the Kom6 River in the West in
the 18th and 19th centuries. Their famous king Osei Tutu came to power in the
1670s and established his capital in Kumasi. The traditional Ashanti political struc-
ture included villages that were, in turn, grouped in territorial divisions. The chief of
the capital village served as the paramount chief of the territorial division. Similarly,
the paramount chief of the national capital Kumasi served as chief of the Ashanti
state. 1 MICROPAEDIA [READY REFERENCE] 620-21, NEw ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA
(1986).
256. Precise language in the opinion is "professionals, business people, and those
who are highly educated." Ananeh-Firempong, 766 F.2d at 623.
257. The applicant's father was a close friend of Dr. Hilla Limann, the former head
of state. He had named his daughter Nkurumah after Kwame Nkruma, the founder
of Dr. Limann's Convention Peoples Party. The applicant's father had held many
posts in the party.
258. Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, the current leader of Ghana, first came to
power in a coup onJune 4, 1979. Rawlings remained in power for three months after
the 1979 coup. He returned to power in a coup on December 31, 1981. He has
remained in power since that time. 1993 WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 757
(1993).
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Criteria for Determining Refugee Status,25 9 which states:
A "particular social group" normally comprises persons of similar back-
ground, habits or social status. . . Membership of [sic] such a particular
social group may be at the root of persecution because there is no confi-
dence in the group's loyalty to the Government or because the political outlook,
antecedents or economic activity of its members, or the very existence of the
social group as such, is held to be an obstacle to the Government's
policies. 260
Based on the elements set forth in the UNHCR Handbook, the court con-
cluded that Ananeh-Firempong had adequately alleged a fear of perse-
cution due to her membership in particular social groups. The court
emphasized that Ananeh-Firempong had described persecution of peo-
ple who shared her background and social status, and had presented
evidence that the Rawlings government in Ghana distrusted the loyalty
of the prosperous, well-educated elite. The court did not specify which
of the three social groups in which Ananeh-Firempong claimed mem-
bership-the Ashanti people, the educated elite, the friends of the over-
thrown government-constituted a social group within the meaning of
the refugee definition. The court's emphasis on background and social
status indicated that it believed membership in the Ashanti and mem-
bership in the prosperous class of society both were important. The
court's emphasis on political outlook and antecedents indicates that it
also viewed friends of the former president as a social group within the
meaning of the refugee definition. Although vague about its view of the
precise social groups involved, the court expressly noted that the fears
of persecution voiced by Ananeh-Firempong arose from characteristics
beyond her power to change. In terms of the Acosta definition of social
group, Ananeh-Firempong faced danger due to immutable characteris-
tics. The social class and political milieu into which she was born, the
educational advantages and economic status previously enjoyed by her
family, and the tribal- background of her forebears were all matters
beyond her control.
The facts asserted by Ananeh-Firempong, if true, present a compel-
ling case for refugee status. Is it, however, a claim of persecution based
on political opinion masquerading as persecution based on social
group? Ananeh-Firempong's family was very active in the political party
now out of favor. Also, the prosperous elite to which her family
belonged had supported the out-of-favor party, and accordingly was
viewed as potentially disloyal to the Rawlings government. Thus, it
seems likely that at least two of the alleged social groups, the educated
elite and the friends ofthe overthrown government, received harsh
treatment because of their perceived political beliefs. 2(5" To what extent
259. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 46.
260. Id. paras. 77-78 (emphasis added by the court).
261. Persecution based on a political opinion that the victim does not hold consti-
tutes persecution based on political opinion within the meaning of the refugee defini-
tion, so long as it is the persecutor's mistaken view of the victim's political opinion
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the Ashanti were persecuted due to their perceived political views is
unclear from the opinion. There is an implication that the Rawlings
government also considered the Ashanti politically suspect, 26 2 but this
issue was left for development on remand.
Of course, individuals often may fear persecution for more than one
reason, and it is not surprising that persecution for political opinion and
for membership in a social group overlap. Indeed, that is often likely to
be the case,263 as the Handbook's interpretation of particular social group
demonstrates. Although the Handbook suggests that persons of similar
background, habits, or social status-as opposed to people of similar
political views-are likely to be considered a social group, the Handbook
explains that persecution based on membership in a social group fre-
quently occurs because the government lacks confidence in the group's
loyalty or perceives the group's political outlook or economic activity as
an obstacle to government policies. 26 4 Thus, the Handbook gives a polit-
ical cast to the social group term.
This political dimension is not restricted to the social group cate-
gory of persecution. This type of political dimension also applies to the
other bases for refugee status: race, religion, and nationality. Although
the political dimension is often not explicitly acknowledged, people per-
secuted on account of race, religion, or nationality generally become
targets for persecution because the persecuted group as a whole-
whether it be a racial, religious, or ethnic group-is perceived by the
government as unreliable or disloyal. 265
What is perhaps unusual about Ananeh-Firempong's case is that, in
addition to persecution in which the political implications are somewhat
subtle, she alleges persecution based on overt political opinion: her
father was active in the party that ruled the country before its overthrow
by Rawlings. From an American point of view, this is classic political
that motivates the persecution. See discussion of imputed political opinion, supra note
136.
262. The Ashanti ancestry is described in the same paragraph as the prosperous
elite considered by the Rawlings government to be politically suspect. Ananeh-
Firempong, 766 F.2d at 623.
263. The UNHCR Handbook specifically states that persecution based on social
group often overlaps with persecution based on political opinion. UNHCR HAND-
BOOK, supra note 46, para. 77.
264. Id. para. 78. See Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992).
265. Governments' underlying motives for persecuting the victimized group may
vary. For example, sometimes governments persecute those deemed unreliable
because they are viewed as inferior, which is how the Nazis described the Jews and
Gypsies which they exterminated. See generally GERALD REITLINGER, THE FINAL SOLU-
TION (1953). Sometimes governments persecute those deemed unreliable because
they are viewed as apostates from the "true" religion and thus likely to have alle-
giances to institutions and principles different from those controlled by the state.
This appears to have been the fate of the Baha'i community in Iran in the 1 980s. See
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, IRAN: A COUNTRY STUDY 127 (Helen Chapin Metz ed.,
1989). Fierce persecution of religious leaders and groups occurred in Cambodia in
the 1970s under the Khmer Rouge. See CAMBODIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note
249, at 55.
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opinion; there is no need to reach further and examine allegations of
persecution based on social group. Nonetheless, if the allegations about
Ananeh-Firempong's family's political prominence are disregarded, as
they may be when she presents evidence on remand to support her
claim, her other bases of persecution remain. Her Ashanti ancestry and
her social status, though they perhaps have political implications, do not
depend on evidence pertaining to expression of any political opinion.
Whether the educated elite and the Ashanti support the overthrown
government, and whether the Rawlings government believes them to be
disloyal may be irrelevant. The crucial point is whether evidence sup-
ports the claims that the Ashanti are persecuted for being Ashanti and
the elite are persecuted for their social status. In this respect, the claim
of persecution based on membership in a social group, as opposed to
political opinion, is important to Ananeh-Firempong's attempt to
demonstrate that she fits within the refugee definition. Social group and
political opinion are not simply redundant.
It is possible, of course, to hypothesize persecution without any
concern about political opinion. For example, a government could
decide to persecute all handicapped individuals, no matter what their
political loyalty, in an attempt to "improve" society. Clearly, persecu-
tion in such a situation should be deemed persecution based on mem-
bership in a social group, rather than persecution based on political
opinion. In the real world, however, persecution focused on members
of a social group is likely to implicate political opinion. Although the
social group may have no explicit political identity or loyalty, the motiva-
tion for persecution of that group probably is that there "is no confi-
dence in the group's loyalty to the government. 266 Despite this
implicit political dimension, proving that the group was persecuted for
its political opinion might be difficult. Thus, the concept of social group
is a needed one; it fills a noticeable gap in the categories of victims of
persecution.267
In 1986 the Ninth Circuit addressed the definition of particular
social group in Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S. 268 Luis Alonzo Sanchez-Trujillo
and Luis Armando Escobar-Nieto, citizens of El Salvador, sought asylum
in the United States. Sanchez-Trujillo testified that he had been a mem-
ber of a Catholic youth organization, and that the priest who headed the
266. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 46, para. 78.
267. Although many "gaps" remain, in that there are many types of persecution
that do not fall within the refugee definition set forth by the Geneva Convention,
such as persecution based on private motivation or persecution endemic to bystand-
ers of civil wars, the social group concept fits closely with the other four categories
recognized by the Geneva Convention. As mentioned in the text, in some ways social
group can be seen as a kind of "implicit political opinion" category. Seen in this
manner, it bears a resemblance to the nationality, race, and religion categories of
persecution, as well as to the political opinion category. Thus, social group closes a
gap in terms of types of persecution that were well-recognized in the late 1940s and
early 1950s by the drafters of the Geneva Convention.
268. 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
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organization disappeared for a month and reappeared with bruises on
his face after demonstrations near the church. In addition, Sanchez-
Trujillo alleged that government officials stopped him briefly four times,
asked him to produce identification, and searched him for weapons. He
was never arrested. After fleeing El Salvador and entering the United
States, Sanchez-Trujillo participated in an organization protesting con-
ditions in El Salvador. 269
Escobar-Nieto testified that men in a vehicle with government
license plates attacked him one night in San Salvador, beat him, robbed
him, and released him. Other than robbery, there was no apparent
motive for this beating. He also testified that he had been at two dem-
onstrations that government forces violently dispersed, but had not
been involved in the violence.
Both Sanchez-Trujillo and Escobar-Nieto alleged that they faced
persecution as members of the particular social group comprised of
"young, urban, working class males of military age who had never
served in the military or otherwise expressed support for the govern-
ment of El Salvador.' 270 In addition, both claimed that they feared per-
secution based on political opinion.2 7 1 The immigration judge ruled
that neither Sanchez-Trujillo nor Escobar-Nieto had presented sufficient
evidence of a well-founded fear of persecution.2 72 The Board of Immi-
gration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge's ruling.2 7 3 The BIA
specifically held that young, urban, working class males without military
service did not constitute a particular social group within the meaning of
the Refugee Act of 1980.274
269. The court characterized his association with the organization as brief, and
gave no indication that Sanchez-Trujillo had participated in public protests or had
otherwise become known as a member of this unnamed group. Id. at 1573.
270. Id.
271. Sanchez-Trujillo maintained that he feared persecution due to imputed polit-
ical opinion. Id. See supra note 136, for a discussion of imputed political opinion.
Presumably, he meant that his participation in the Catholic youth organization and/
or in the protest organization in the United States might be seen by Salvadoran gov-
ernment officials or right-wing vigilantes as an expression of disloyalty to the Salva-
doran regime.
Originally he had also claimed that he feared persecution based upon religious
belief, due to his membership in the Catholic youth organization, but he abandoned
this argument on appeal. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1573 n.2.
272. The applicants claimed they had a well-founded fear of persecution, which
entitled them to asylum, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988), and that their lives and freedom
would be threatened if they were sent back to El Salvador, which entitled them to
withholding of deportation, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988). The immigration judge
denied both claims. In affirming, the BIA acknowledged and applied a more gener-
ous standard of proof to the asylum claim than to the withholding of deportation
claim. Matter of Sanchez and Escobar, Int. Dec. 2996, (BIA 1985). Although this
case preceded the Supreme Court's ruling in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421
(1987), which articulated different burdens of proof for asylum and withholding of
deportation, the standards of proof applied here were consonant with the Supreme
Court's subsequent ruling.
273. The BIA ruled that the applicants failed to satisfy their burden of proof. The
BIA granted voluntary departure of 30 days. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1573.
274. Id.
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In reviewing the BIA decision, the Ninth Circuit grappled with the
phrase "particular social group." The Ninth Circuit examined legisla-
tive history, 275 United States case law, 276 and the UNHCR Handbook 277
for assistance in defining this term. Finding none of these sources help-
ful, the court embarked on its own statutory construction. The court's
initial premise was that the social group category is a broad and flexible
one, but one circumscribed by a "practical appreciation of the reason-
ably limited scope of the term 'refugee.' "278 In light of this "practical
appreciation," the court decided that a particular social group must be
more than a recognized demographic category. For example, a group of
males taller than six feet would constitute a group, but not a particular
social group within the meaning of the Refugee Act of 1980.279 The
court paid special attention to the adjectives "particular" and "social,"
and concluded that they required some associational relationship.
Thus, the court defined a particular social group:
people closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some com-
mon impulse or interest. Of central concern is the existence of a volun-
tary associational relationship among the purported members, which
imparts some common characteristic that is fundamental to their identity
as a member of that discrete social group. 280
In light of its definition, the court concluded that the immediate
members of a family would comprise a particular social group. The
court viewed a family as a "small, readily identifiable group" that would
have common interests and "fundamental affiliational concerns. '"281
The court contrasted a family with the particular social group alleged by
the plaintiffs: young, working class, urban males of military age who
have never served in the military or otherwise expressed support for the
government of El Salvador. According to the court, these men-like the
six-footers-constitute a group, but not a particular social group.
Rather than a small, readily identifiable group, they are a "major seg-
ment of the population of an embattled nation. ' 28 2 Rather than a cohe-
sive or homogeneous group, they are a group of disparate individuals
275. The court described the legislative history as "generally uninformative on this
point." Id. at 1575.
276. Noting that there is a "dearth ofjudicial authority construing the meaning of
.particular social group,'" the court discussed solely the Ananeh-Firempong case. It
concluded that "[w]hatever the merits of the First Circuit's decision under the cir-
cumstances of that case, the decision provides no guidance as to the outer limits of
the 'social group' category." Id. at 1575 n.6.
277. Characterizing the Handbook as a "significant source of guidance," the court
found that the Handbook provided "little assistance in arriving at a workable definition
of 'particular social group.'" Id. at 1576.
278. Id.
279. Id. The court concluded that these individuals would not comprise a particu-
lar social group even ifthey could show that they were at greater risk of persecution
than the general population. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1577.
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with "different lifestyles, varying interests, diverse cultures, and contrary
political leanings." 28 3
Clearly, young working class urban males of military age in El Salva-
dor do not comprise a small homogenous group. The court's own defi-
nition, however, refers to close affiliation and common interest, not
small size and homogeneity. Specifically, the court's definition refers to
a "common characteristic that is fundamental to their identity as a mem-
ber of that discrete social group."' 284 The court never discusses the
common characteristics of the purported social group in this case, how-
ever, nor analyzes whether any of those characteristics are fundamental
to their group identity. Rather the court leaps to the conclusion that this
group of young, working class, urban males is not a particular social
group. The lack of application of the principles enunciated by the court
to the facts of the case renders the Sanchez-Trujillo opinion unsatisfac-
tory. Had the court attempted to apply its definition to the facts, it
might have concluded that its definition needed to be refined.
A closer look at the court's proffered social group definition reveals
three elements: (1) voluntary associational relationship; (2) common
characteristic (or impulse or interest); and (3) a characteristic fundamen-
tal to their group identity. An examination of the young, working-class,
urban males group in light of the court's analysis is revealing. Certainly,
in terms of the court's second factor, young working-class urban males
of military age have common characteristics: age, sex, social status, and
geographical location.
Whether these characteristics are fundamental to their group iden-
tity, as the court's third factor requires, depends on one's perception of
the relevant group as well as the evidence of the, risk to the group.
Although for most of their lives these young, working-class, urban men
may not have viewed their age, location, and social status as particularly
central to their identity, the fact that the confluence of these factors now
puts them in a group that is at great risk of death may well have trans-
formed these characteristics into central ones. Clearly, these character-
istics once thought to be peripheral may now appear overwhelmingly
important; a present consciousness of these factors and the risk they
entail may have led to the development of a sense of solidarity or shared
identity with others in the Salvadoran population who possess these
characteristics. In other words, over an individual's lifetime different
characteristics may be more or less central at different times. The
court's requirement of common characteristics central to group identity
does not specify that the centrality be constant throughout all stages of
life. 2 85 Consequently, one could easily conclude that these characteris-
tics are fundamental to that particular social group. Thus, the lack of
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1576.
285. If it did, many groups intuitively thought of as social groups in the refugee
context would fail to satisfy the refugee definition. For example, the economic class
one is born into, or the league of voters one belongs to, or the religion one practices
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common characteristics is not the attribute that prevents the group of
young, working-class urban males from constituting a particular social
group under the court's definition.
Rather, the absence of any voluntary association binding the group
members together is the definitional problem. Indeed, the lack of the
court's first listed factor, voluntary association, is what makes the young,
working-class, urban males seem like the six-footers-a group existing
in society, but not a "particular social group." A closer look at this factor
indicates that voluntary association should not be a necessary prerequi-
site to finding persecution based on social group. Although the court
suggested that the immediate members of a family would constitute a
typical social group, the very factor that excludes the six-footers and the
young, working-class, urban males, would preclude a family from consti-
tuting a particular social group. 286 Family members are involuntarily
related to each other; children, siblings, and cousins have no say over
the family into which they are born. Furthermore, family members may
or may not voluntarily associate together. Although many family mem-
bers choose to associate together, certainly there are numerous
instances when individuals choose not to associate with other family
members.
The questionableness of the "voluntary association" element of the
Ninth Circuit's definition renders the definition itself suspect. Close
analysis of the other two elements reveals that they are not useful in
distinguishing "groups" from "particular social groups," since the
"common characteristic ... fundamental to [group] identity" factors are
circular descriptions. Whatever characteristics define the group will
always be common characteristics shared by the group. Furthermore,
the characteristics used to define the group will always be fundamental
to the group members, at least insofar as their membership in that par-
ticular social group is concerned. As explained above, although young,
working-class, urban males are a very disparate group of individuals,
their age, sex, social status, and geographical location are common char-
acteristics that are the crux of their identity as group members.
In fact, the Ninth Circuit's hesitation about defining as a particular
social group a large, heterogeneous group of people who do not know
each other is understandable. Unfortunately, the court's intuitive
may be crucial to one's sense of identity and purpose during some stages of life and
peripheral during others.
286. In contrast to voluntary association, the second requirement, possessing a
common characteristic, is more easily satisfied by members of a family. The issue is
from whose perspective this common characteristic is to be observed. From within a
family, the family members may seem diverse and even disconnected. Indeed, family
members may believe that they have little in common with other members of the
same family. From outside the family, the perception is different. The outside world
generally views family members, no matter how disparate, as sharing a common char-
acteristic: common parentage or ancestry. This common characteristic also satisfies
the third requirement. Lineage or family heritage is very often viewed as fundamen-
tal to identity. Certainly, it is fundamental to the identity of a family as a particular
social group.
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response to the facts did not yield a satisfactory definition. Voluntary
association, in itself, is not sufficient. Moreover, it should not be a nec-
essary element of proof. The refugee definition should encompass
social groups that include members whose association with each other is
involuntary. For example, persecution of members of a family due to
their family relationship should be recognized as persecution of a partic-
ular social group. Similarly, the refugee definition should encompass
some social groups whose members may not even associate with each
other. Persecution of the former land-owning class should be recog-
nized as persecution of a particular social group, whether the land-own-
ers associated with each other or not. History shows that members of
particular social groups have been persecuted despite group members'
lack of interest in associating with each other. The Nazi persecution of
non-religious Jews totally assimilated into German society is only one
vivid example.28 7
In 1990 another panel of the Ninth Circuit examined an application
for asylum based on persecution due to membership in a particular
social group. The social group asserted in De Valle v. INS 28 8 was com-
posed of families of military deserters. De Valle explained that her hus-
band had been in the Salvadoran army for six years. She said that he
was forced by his military commanders to participate in massacres of
civilians in 1981. During that same year he was shot at by unknown
gunmen while he was off-duty, but wearing a military uniform. Shortly
after that incident, Mr. De Valle refused to obey the command that he
return to duty. Stating that he neither wanted to participate in future
violence against civilians nor to be a target of guerrilla sympathizers, he
and his wife fled to the United States.
The case before the Ninth Circuit involved only the wife's claim for
asylum. Mrs. De Valle argued that she would be persecuted for her
political opinion as well as her membership in a particular social group.
She asserted that Salvadorans would conclude from her husband's
desertion that he possessed anti-government political opinions and that
she, as his wife, would also be deemed to hold the same political opin-
ions. She also claimed that she would be persecuted as a member of a
disloyal social group, the families of deserters from the military. The
court rejected both claims, essentially ruling that she had failed to pro-
duce credible evidence to substantiate her fear of persecution. The
court went further, however, and added that family members of desert-
ers do not constitute a social group within the meaning of the Refugee
Act of 1980.289 The court relied heavily on the reasoning in Sanchez-
Trujillo,290 inquiring whether the purported social group was a closely
287. See WILLIAM S. ALLEN, THE NAZI SEIZURE OF POWER 209-13 (1965); see generally
THE FINAL SOLUTION, supra note 265.
288. 901 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1990).
289. Id. at 793.
290. 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986), discussed supra in text accompanying notes
268-87.
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affiliated group with common impulses or interests, who voluntarily
associated with each other in a manner that identified them as members
of a discrete social group.2 9 1 The court stated:
The social group in which De Valle claims membership-families of
deserters-is by no means closely affiliated or discrete. While there may
be some common impulse of interest that, at a high level of generality,
ties the families of deserters together, the differences between such fami-
lies far outweigh the similarities.
... [S]uch a group 'does not exemplify the type of 'social group' for
which the immigration laws provide protection from persecution' because
'[i]ndividuals falling within the parameters of this sweeping demographic
division naturally manifest a plethora of different lifestyles, varying inter-
ests, diverse cultures, and contrary political leanings.' Family members of
deserters, like young urban males, are.. . a diverse, fragmented segment
of the population. As we have stated before, '[m]ajor segments of the
population of an embattled nation, even though undoubtedly at some risk
from general political violence, will rarely, if ever, constitute a distinct
'social group' for the purposes of establishing refugee status.' 2 92
In sum, the Ninth Circuit again was disturbed by the size and the
heterogeneity of the asserted social group. The differences in lifestyles,
beliefs, and interests that existed within the group seemed too extreme.
Neither this court nor the Sanchez-Trujillo court asked whether Salvado-
ran society, or important segments of it, perceived this heterogeneous
collection of people as a particular social group. Inquiring into the
external perception of the putative group might have proved helpful.
Returning to the Nazi example mentioned before, there is no doubt that
there were wide variations in terms of lifestyles, beliefs, and interests
amongJewish families in Germany in the 1930's. There is also no doubt
that the Nazi regime perceived the Jewish people, no matter their differ-
ences, as a group to exterminate.
Most recently, the Second Circuit has addressed the social group
issue in reviewing an asylum claim filed by a Salvadoran woman fighting
deportation from the United States.2 93 Unfortunately, the case involved
facts that portrayed the plaintiff in a less than sympathetic light, which
may have diminished the court's willingness to take a serious look at the
definition of social group. Carmen Gomez entered the United States
illegally in 1979 at the age of eighteen. For nine years she worked at
various jobs, which, by the end, included selling cocaine. In 1989 she
was convicted of three drug felonies and sentenced to prison.29 4 At her
291. De VZalle, 901 F.2d at 793.
292. Id. at 793.
293. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2nd Cir. 1991).
294. She was originally indicted for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the
third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.
Later she was indicted on two additional counts of criminal sale of a controlled sub-
stance in the third degree. Still later she was indicted for criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the third, fourth, and seventh degrees. She pleaded guilty to
criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree and to two counts of crimi-
nal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. Id. at 662.
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deportation hearing, Gomez conceded deportability due to illegal entry
but contested deportability as an aggravated felon. She declined to des-
ignate a country to which she could be deported. After the government
requested that El Salvador be designated as the destination, Gomez for
the first time applied for asylum in the United States. 29 5
Gomez alleged that she had been raped and beaten five times
between the ages of twelve and fourteen by guerillas in El Salvador. She
asserted that she belonged to the social group of women who have been
beaten and raped by Salvadoran guerrillas and that members of this
group are singled out for persecution in El Salvador. The court rejected
her claim, stating that she had failed to show that she was any more
likely to be persecuted than any other woman. 29 6 Essentially, Gomez
lost her case because she failed to convince the court that she had a well-
founded fear of persecution. Although it was not necessary to analyze
additional elements of the refugee definition, the court went on to dis-
cuss social group:
The phrase 'particular social group' has been defined to encompass
'a collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated
by some common impulse or interest.' A particular social group is com-
prised of individuals who possess some fundamental characteristic in
common which serves to distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor-or
in the eyes of the outside world in general. Like the traits which distin-
guish the other four enumerated categories-race, religion, nationality
and political opinion-the attributes of a particular social group must be
recognizable and discrete. Possession of broadly-based characteristics
such as youth and gender will not by itself endow individuals with mem-
bership in a particular group. 29 7
The court stated that Gomez had produced no evidence that there were
traits other than youth and gender that could identify members of the
particular social group upon which Gomez based her claim. Accord-
295. Id.
296. The court opinion is silent on the evidence submitted by Gomez. From this
silence I infer that the only evidence supporting the assertion that women who had
been beaten and raped years ago were likely to be beaten and raped now was
Gomez's own testimony. There is no requirement that an asylum applicant submit
corroborating evidence to bolster her testimony, and the applicant's own testimony,
if consistent and believable, can be sufficient. Matter of Mogharrabi, Int. Dec. 3028
(BIA 1987); Bianco Comarribas v. INS, 830 F.2d 1039, 1041-43 (9th Cir. 1987); Car-
rajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984); M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 858
F.2d 210, 214 (4th Cir. 1988). The facts of Gomez's case, however, raise some obvi-
ous concerns about whether it was likely she would face persecution in the 1990s in
El Salvador. For example, she claimed she was brutalized repeatedly between the
ages of 12 and 14. She remained in El Salvador for four more years, however, and
apparently was not brutalized during that time. Furthermore, she had been in the
United States for 12 years at the time of her deportation hearing. Consequently,
sixteen years had elapsed since the prior attacks on her. This meant that Gomez not
only had the burden of proving the existence of a social group of women raped and
beaten by Salvadoran guerrillas, but also the burden of proving that sixteen years
later she would still be perceived as a member of that group and would be persecuted
due to her membership in the group.
297. Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664.
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ingly, the court concluded that if members of the particular group could
not be identified, individuals in the group could not be persecuted for
their membership in the group. In reaching this conclusion the court
took care to indicate that repeated attacks on women can give rise to a
well-founded fear of persecution:
Certainly, we do not discount the physical and emotional pain that
has been wantonly inflicted on these Salvadoran women. Moreover, we
do not suggest that women who have been repeatedly and systematically
brutalized by particular attackers cannot assert a well-founded fear of per-
secution. We cannot, however, find that Gomez has demonstrated that
she is more likely to be persecuted than any other young woman.2 98
Although it may have been dicta, the Second Circuit's analysis of
social groups is important. It may be, at base, a rehash of the Sanchez-
Trujillo formulation, but it goes farther. For the first time in United
States jurisprudence a court has expressly stated that external percep-
tions are as important in defining social groups as an innate or funda-
mental trait that might bind some groups together. Furthermore, the
court went beyond "the eyes of the persecutor," which one might argue
is always implicitly part of the decision to target a particular group; the
court explicitly stated that "the eyes of the outside world in general"
may tell us which collection of individuals constitutes a social group and
which does not. The absence of any proof on this issue doomed
Gomez's asylum claim. Although the Second Circuit did not state so in
precise words, the thrust of its decision in Gomez is that neither internal
traits nor external perception bind together into a social group young
Salvadoran women who have been repeatedly brutalized by guerrillas.
The women do not know each other, do not share common interests,
and do not have similar lifestyles. Moreover, society at large does not
perceive these women as a social group.
The Gomez court does not call upon jurisprudence in other countries
in its efforts to interpret the social group term. It does, however, pro-
pose an analysis that is similar to the interpretive approaches that
appear in both German and Canadian jurisprudence. These approaches
recognize that it is too narrow to focus only on the internal structure
and common interests, background, and status of the alleged social
group. Although those are useful starting points, the perception by
society of the existence of a social group-whatever combination of sim-
ilar and dissimilar individuals comprise it-is equally important. If the
Gomez approach to social group is a precursor of U.S. case law develop-
ments, the social group definition in the United States will be more in
line with that in other countries.
A comparative perspective also highlights some important differ-
ences. In the United States, the reasoning in Sanchez-Trujillo, which is
repeated and emphasized in other cases such as De Valle and Gomez, prac-
tically reads out of the social group term any group that is even partially
298. Id.
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defined by broad-based characteristics such as youth or gender. Neither
Canadian nor German cases evidence the same disfavor. As a practical
matter, the governments of all three countries will be troubled if they
think that huge portions of a country undergoing a civil war can claim
asylum based on persecution due to membership in a particular social
group. Although the Germans and Canadians surely have this very real
concern, they have not allowed it to influence the development of the
social group concept. They have not disqualified large groups from the
refugee definition merely due to their size. Rather they have recognized
that other elements of the refugee definition will narrow the pool of
those who have claims to refugee status. Refugee applicants must prove
a well-founded fear of persecution, and persecution is not the same
thing as discomfort or danger. Moreover, applicants must prove that
the persecution is due to their membership in a particular social group.
2 99
It is not sufficient in strife-torn countries to show that some members of
a social group may face persecution. The refugee definition requires a
link between the membership in the group and the persecution that the
applicants fear. Recognizing that the refugee definition has built-in lim-
its perhaps would allow the United States case law concerning social
groups to develop in a less distorted manner. This would be another
step in the right direction and would bring United States decisional law
more in line with other countries' interpretations of persecution based
on membership in a particular social group.
Conclusion
This review of the Refugee Convention, national refugee legislation,
scholarly commentary, and judicial opinions in three countries indicates
that the social group concept is still unsettled in refugee law. The
national approaches to claims of persecution based on membership in a
particular social group vary significantly. The German courts have iden-
tified three pertinent social group criteria: the homogeneity of the
group, the inner structure of the group, and the perceptions of the gen-
eral population as to the existence of a discrete and undesirable group.
299. This does not mean that asylum seekers must show that they have been or will
be singled out for persecution. Rather it means that members of the social group
fear persecution based on their membership, not based on random violence or based
on reasons unrelated to membership in the group. It is, of course, unnecessary for
an asylum seeker to prove an explicit policy mandating persecution of members of a
social group. An implicit policy suffices and can be inferred from persecution of
other members of the group if there appears to be no basis for persecution other
than their social group.
INS v. Elias Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992), is not to the contrary. In that case, the
Court stated that an asylum seeker who based his claim on political opinion must
show via direct or circumstantial evidence (1) that he had a political opinion and (2)
that he had a well-founded fear that the guerrillas would persecute him because of
that political opinion, not because of some other reason. Id. Applying that reasoning
to the social group setting, asylum seekers must show (1) that they are members of a
particular social group and (2) that they have a well-founded fear that they will be
persecuted for membership in that social group. Id.
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It is unclear whether the German courts view the external perception
element as an alternative to the homogeneity and internal structure ele-
ments or as an additional requirement. If the latter, the cumulative
effect of these three criteria may reduce the types of groups that fall
within the social group concept. If, however, the external perceptions
constitute an alternative criterion, a wider array of groups of individuals
will be encompassed by the social group aspect of the refugee
definition.3 00
In Canada, the Immigration and Refugee Board analyzes social
group claims in a manner similar to the "alternative" German approach.
The Board first asks whether the group is defined by an internal charac-
teristic that is innate, immutable, or fundamental to the members' iden-
tity or human dignity. The Board also examines whether there are
external perceptions that this is a group that is threatening or danger-
ous. A group that satisfies any one of the elements of the standard satis-
fies the social group concept.
The U.S. approach to social group, because it is articulated in judi-
cial decisions issued by different federal judicial circuits, is more variable
than that of Germany and Canada. The Acosta standard, which empha-
sizes common immutable characteristics or characteristics that are so
fundamental to identity that they should not have to be changed, will
pose a major hurdle to many groups. The Acosta analysis is partly sub-
sumed in the Canadian approach, but there is an important difference.
Acosta searches only for immutable characteristics or concerns funda-
mental to identity; in Canada the analysis extends further and inquires
into society's perceptions of the group.
Under Ananeh-Firempong, asylum seekers need to prove that they are
members of groups consisting of people who share similar backgrounds,
habits, or social status. There is no express acknowledgement that
external perceptions of the group are relevant, nor is there an explicit
requirement of fundamental or immutable characteristics.
Sanchez-Trujillo and DeValle require a voluntary associational rela-
tionship and common characteristics (or impulses or interests) that are
fundamental to group identity. They reject groups comprised of indi-
viduals of "different lifestyles, varying interests, diverse cultures, and
contrary political leanings." 3 0' They do not inquire into immutable
traits or to general societal views of the group in question.
Most recently, Gomez acknowledges that a social group must be per-
ceived as a recognizable and discrete group in society whose members
possess a common characteristic that distinguishes them in the eyes of
the outside world. This echoes a portion of the German and the Cana-
300. See supra text accompanying notes 174-78, for a discussion of the lack of syn-
thesis of the German cases. Whatever the approach applied by the courts reviewing
asylum claims, the much more important issue is the approach taken by the Federal
Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees, supra note 178, which is the adminis-
trative agency that initially rules on asylum applications filed in Germany.
301. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576.
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dian analyses, and makes it possible for a broader array of social groups
to be recognized under the refugee definition.
This comparison of the social group definitions posited by German,
Canadian, and U.S. law illustrates the difficulties asylum seekers have in
relying on this aspect of the refugee definition. Furthermore, it demon-
strates that the refugee jurisprudence in Germany, Canada, and the
United States contains important similarities and differences. To the
extent the United States jurisprudence continues down the path recently
started in Gomez and takes into account the external perception of a
social group, the similarities are likely to increase and the differences
diminish.

